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Considerations and Healthcare Quality 
Implications 
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Arlen W. Langvardt*** 
ABSTRACT 
 In 1999, the Institute of Medicine estimated that approxi-
mately 98,000 deaths resulted annually from medical errors. 
This shocking number does not appear to have lessened during 
the intervening years. Mistake-proofing techniques similar to 
those that have proven useful in the product liability context 
hold great promise for reducing the number of medical errors. 
However, the adoption of such techniques in healthcare settings 
is more limited than expected. 
This article examines potentially useful mistake-proofing 
techniques, explores the largely unsound reasons why healthcare 
professionals have been slow to adopt such techniques, and ex-
plores the implications of mistake-proofing adoption (or lack 
thereof) for malpractice litigation and liability. Along the way, 
this article considers the undesirable effects of misperceptions 
on the part of healthcare professionals regarding their risks of 
being held liable in a malpractice case. This article also propos-
es ways of encouraging greater adoption of mistake-proofing 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Issues of healthcare access and affordability have received 
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considerable media attention in recent years and have been the 
subjects of political debate, regulatory action, and judicial deci-
sions.1 Although the focus on access and affordability has not 
kept healthcare quality issues from also being noted, the prob-
lem of how to improve healthcare quality remains a trouble-
some one.2 An “unconscionable error rate”3 documented in a 
landmark study in 1999 by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
shocked many, as the IOM estimated that up to 98,000 deaths 
                                                          
1.  Most notably, huge numbers of media reports dealt with controversies 
preceding and following the 2010 enactment of the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 26 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights 
Is Rallying Cry of Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A1 (providing 
examples of states’ legislative reactions asserting states’ rights); Kevin Sack, 
In Partisan Battle, Governors Clash With Attorneys General Over Lawsuits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at A25 (highlighting states with partisan battles 
relating to the decision to join the federal health care mandate litigation); see 
also James Osborne, Tenth Amendment Movement Aims to Give Power Back to 
the States, FOX NEWS (May 26, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/ 
2009/05/26/tenth-amendment-movement-aims-power-states (noting that at 
least 35 states asserted Tenth Amendment rights within the year). In the 
high-profile 2012 decision on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute’s individual mandate—the re-
quirement that all individuals have health insurance in force in 2014 and 
thereafter or else incur an obligation to make a shared responsibility payment, 
26 U.S.C. §5000A (2012)—was a valid exercise of the congressional power to 
tax. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, Nos. 11-393, 11-398 and 11-400, slip 
op. at 33–44 (U.S. June 28, 2012); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (provid-
ing Congress with the “power to lay and collect taxes”). The Court, however, 
held that Congress exceeded its constitutional powers in providing that a state 
risked losing all existing Medicaid funding if it declined to participate in a 
Medicaid expansion that Congress initially would fully fund but that later 
would lead to an obligation on the part of the state to pay ten percent of the 
added costs. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., slip op. at 49–50. The Court resolved 
the constitutional problem by holding that states could decide whether to par-
ticipate in the Medicaid expansion without risking the loss of existing Medi-
caid funding if they said “no” to the expansion. Id. at 55–58. 
2.  See, e.g., John W. Hill, Arlen W. Langvardt & Anne P. Massey, Law, 
Information Technology, and Medical Errors: Toward a National Healthcare 
Information Network Approach to Improving Patient Care and Reducing Mal-
practice Costs, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 159, 159–65 (noting the grow-
ing role that information technology should play in reducing medical errors); 
Phillip T. Powell & Ron Laufer, Promises and Constraints of Consumer-
Directed Healthcare, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 171, 171–72, 177 (2010) (arguing that 
consumer-directed healthcare will not only lower costs, but also increase quali-
ty). 
3.  David Ahern, Patient-Centered Computing and eHealth: Transform-
ing Healthcare Quality, Introductory Remarks at Harvard Medical School 
Seminar (Mar. 28–30, 2008) (on file with authors). 
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per year resulted from medical errors.4 There are indications 
that the incidence of errors has not abated in the years since 
the IOM’s study, and may even be increasing.5 Accounts of se-
rious medical errors continue to abound.6 
A 2006 report by the IOM identified quality problems so 
serious that, on average, a hospital patient would be subjected 
to at least one medication error per day.7 In a “national report 
card” on American healthcare, the Rand Corporation concluded 
                                                          
4.  Inst. of Med., To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System 31 
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter IOM, TO ERR IS HUMAN]. 
 5. See David L. Classen et al., “Global Trigger Tool” Shows That Adverse 
Events in Hospitals May Be Ten Times Greater Than Previously Measured, 30 
HEALTH AFF. 581, 581–82, 586 (2011) (implementing a new method for detect-
ing adverse events in a hospital setting); Christopher P. Landrigan et al., 
Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient Harm Resulting from Medical Care, 363 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2124, 2130, 2133 (2010) (reporting the results of a study of 
ten North Carolina hospitals); U.S. Hospital Errors Continue to Rise, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 2, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2007/04/02/AR2007040200813.html (reporting the results from an examina-
tion of Medicare hospitalization records); see also A National Survey of Medi-
cal Error Reporting Laws, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 201, 202 
(2008) [hereinafter National Survey] (extrapolating the error rate from the 
IOM study to the population numbers in 2006). 
 6. See, e.g., Charles R. Denham et al., An NTSB for Health Care—
Learning From Innovation: Debate and Innovate or Capitulate, 8 J. PATIENT 
SAFETY 3, 5 (2012) (sharing story of heparin overdose to twin infants); Liz 
Kowalczyk, Mass. Patient Death Rate a Concern, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 6, 2007, at 
B1 (stating that the Massachusetts patient death rate is higher than the na-
tional average); Liz Kowalczyk, Surgical Mistakes Persist in Bay State, BOS. 
GLOBE, Oct. 26, 2007, at A1 (highlighting various surgical errors at a Massa-
chusetts hospital); Jordan Rau, Hospital Mistakes Go Public, L.A. TIMES, June 
30, 2008, at A1 (providing examples of hospital errors in California); Family 
Sues Geisinger Over Newborn’s Death, PENNLIVE.COM (Jan. 11, 2008), 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2008/01/family_sues_geisinger_ov
er_new.html (reporting that an overdose of antibiotics by the hospital led to 
the death of one infant and permanent brain injury in another); Family Sues 
Hospital After Man’s Tonsil Surgery Death, FOX NEWS (Aug. 28, 2008), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,412222,00.html (alleging that an incor-
rectly adjusted breathing tube caused suffocation); Tape Shows Woman Dying 
on Waiting Room Floor, CNN (July 1, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/ 
US/07/01/waiting.room.death/index.html. 
 7. Michael Brophy, The July 2006 IOM Report on Medication Errors, 
MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY (ALM Media Properties, L.L.C., New York, 
N.Y.), Sept. 2006, available at http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ 
ljn_medlaw/23_12/news/147223-1.html. The 2006 IOM report estimated that 
at least 1.5 million preventable medication errors occur each year in hospitals 
and similar medical facilities. INST. OF MED., PREVENTING MEDICATION 
ERRORS 124 (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter IOM, PREVENTING 
MEDICATION ERRORS]. 
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that over time, almost everyone in the United States is at risk 
of receiving poor healthcare.8 An estimated four percent of all 
patients entering hospitals experience some type of adverse in-
cident, approximately half of which are preventable and twen-
ty-five percent of which stem from negligence.9 
Healthcare systems have become more complex as they 
have evolved.10 Various healthcare providers (HCPs)—for in-
stance, hospitals, clinics, physicians, nurses, other medical pro-
fessionals, and staff persons—all play roles in the furnishing of 
care to patients. For institutional HCPs, there are dual lines of 
authority for clinical and administrative staff and powerful 
subcultures that may often clash.11 As a result, it may not be 
clear where the ultimate responsibility for reducing healthcare 
errors resides in a given HCP.12 Healthcare processes also tend 
to be insufficiently connected to one another in any real-time 
fashion,13 leading to gaps in information flow and resulting in 
uneven delivery of care.14 If the error rates in intensive care 
                                                          
 8. RAND HEALTH, THE FIRST NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON QUALITY OF 
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 3 (2006), available at http://www.rand.org/ 
pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB9053-2.pdf (finding that there is little 
variation in receiving recommended medical care, even when looking at race, 
gender, or financial status of individuals); see also Denham et al., supra note 
6, at 3–4 (stating that healthcare harm is the third leading cause of death in 
the United States). Perhaps one of the most glaring indications of underlying 
systemic problems is that the United States, despite its higher healthcare ex-
penditures, has a higher infant mortality rate than any other industrialized 
nation belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD). JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS: 
HOW WE GOT INTO IT AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT 93 (2005). 
 9. Jonathon Todres, Toward Healing and Restoration for All: Reframing 
Medical Malpractice Reform, 39 CONN. L. REV. 667, 679 (2006). 
 10. Brad Broberg, Medical Errors Going Under the Microscope, PUGET 
SOUND BUS. J., (Oct. 28, 2007, 9:00 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/ 
stories/2007/10/29/focus1.html (focusing on the impact that variability has on 
whether the complex system works smoothly). 
 11. R. Nat Natarajan & Amanda Hoffmeister, Do No Harm: Can Health 
Care Live Up to It?, TENN. TECH. U., http://www.tntech.edu/mayberry/noharm/ 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
 12. See id. (noting that the different entities involved in healthcare may 
use different definitions for error and quality in healthcare). 
 13. See Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 197–204 (analyzing 
the role that electronic medical records can play in reducing medical errors). 
 14. Ahern, supra note 3; Sidney Taurel, Chairman & CEO Eli Lilly & Co., 
The Health Care Conundrum: A Call for Leadership, Remarks at the Indiana 
University Kelley School of Business Annual Business Conference (Mar. 8, 
2006) (on file with authors). A lack of understanding of patterns of error and 
lack of communication is often the culprit in causing medical errors, as op-
posed to purely individual human mistakes. Tom Murphy, Clarian Plans 
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units were acceptable, for example, in the airline and banking 
industries, the result would be two dangerous landings per day 
at O’Hare International Airport and 32,000 checks deducted 
from the wrong accounts every hour.15 When one considers 
what is at risk, the high medical error rates in the United 
States become especially difficult to excuse. Yet those high 
rates persist. 
In order to slash the “unconscionable” rate of medical er-
rors and thereby improve healthcare quality, HCPs should 
make greater use of mistake-proofing regimens that feature, 
among other things, the application of lean-manufacturing 
techniques borrowed from industry.16 Mistake-proofing is de-
fined as “the use of process or design features to prevent errors 
or the negative impact of errors.”17 It has been employed in do-
mains other than healthcare with significant success.18 With 
most serious medical errors likely resulting from systems fail-
ures as opposed to the failure of single individuals,19 devising 
means of preventing process errors would be a logical course of 
                                                          
Training Center, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., Apr. 3, 2006, at A3 (supporting the 
opening of a simulation training center for health care professionals). 
 15. Ahern, supra note 3. For another instructive comparison, consider 
that in the era of total-quality management (TQM) and Six-Sigma thinking, 
many business organizations strive to limit errors to 3.4 defects per million 
opportunities. See What is Six Sigma?, ISIXSIGMA MAG., 
http://www.isixsigma.com/sixsigma/six_sigma.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) 
(identifying Six Sigma as a quality measure that “strives for near perfection”). 
 16. John R. Grout & John S. Toussaint, Mistake-Proofing Healthcare: Why 
Stopping Processes May Be a Good Start, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 149, 150 (2010) 
(recognizing the ability of an assembly line to stop at the push of a button is 
sometimes the best reaction to a problem). Other possible approaches to reduc-
ing the number of medical errors include a changed delivery model, better-
crafted incentives for HCPs, a modified tort liability system, and greater use of 
health information technology. See John W. Hill, Angela N. Aneiros & Paul R. 
Hogan, Law and the Healthcare Crisis: The Impact of Medical Malpractice and 
Payment Systems on Physician Compensation and Workload as Antecedents of 
Physician Shortages—Analysis, Implications and Reform Solutions, 2010 U. 
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 91, 132–50. Except to the extent that such other ap-
proaches complement or otherwise constitute a component of a sound mistake-
proofing program, discussion of them is beyond the scope of this article. 
 17. JOHN GROUT, MISTAKE-PROOFING THE DESIGN OF HEALTH CARE 
PROCESSES 1 (2007), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/mistakeproof/mist
akeproofing.pdf. 
 18. See Grout & Toussaint, supra note 16 (showing how Toyota imple-
ments these concepts). 
 19. Lucian L. Leape, The Patient Safety Imperative, Presentation at Har-
vard Medical School Seminar: Progress in Patient Safety (Nov. 3–4, 2008) 
[hereinafter Leape Harvard Seminar Nov. 2008] (on file with authors). 
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action. Doing so should also be highly desirable from the per-
spective of HCPs, given that medical errors may lead to mal-
practice lawsuits—something no HCP wants to face.20 This de-
sirability is enhanced by evidence that mistake-proofing 
techniques and technologies in many cases can be implemented 
inexpensively and can hold the potential to improve return on 
investment.21 
Despite mistake-proofing’s desirability, HCPs tend to adopt 
such processes slowly.22 Improvements in U.S. healthcare qual-
ity have likewise been slow—so slow that in 2009, Consumers 
Union assigned a failing grade to the quality improvement ef-
forts.23 In assigning that grade, Consumers Union noted the 
problematic example that most hospitals did not adopt systems 
and procedures known to prevent medication errors.24 
What accounts for the slow adoption of mistake-proofing 
processes in the healthcare setting? Inadequate regulatory ef-
forts serve as one reason. For example, there is no national en-
tity specifically charged with coordinating, tracking, and mean-
ingfully encouraging patient safety improvements. The current 
fragmented efforts along these lines fall short.25 Moreover, 
                                                          
 20. See, e.g., Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 159–60 (pointing 
out the high cost of medical malpractice claims). HCPs often tend not to be shy 
about voicing their concerns over the supposed prevalence of malpractice law-
suits. See, e.g., id. (identifying malpractice liability as a “crisis” and a focal 
point of the 2004 presidential campaign). In reality, the vast majority of medi-
cal errors—even those that result in harm to a patient—do not lead to mal-
practice litigation. See infra text accompanying notes 264–265. But it is true 
that an error prevented is a potential lawsuit prevented. 
 21. GROUT, supra note 17, at 14–16. 
 22. See id. at 17–20, 23 (providing list of reasons why it is difficult to im-
plement these processes in the healthcare setting). See also id. at iii (“[W]e 
still have much more to do to improve patient safety . . . a little-known but 
very promising approach to preventing medical errors . . . We have only 
scratched the surface . . . as many other devices and applications are still in 
the pipeline or have yet to be discovered and disseminated.”). 
 23. CONSUMERS UNION, TO ERR IS HUMAN—TO DELAY IS DEADLY 12–13 
(2009) [hereinafter CONSUMERS UNION]. In 2000, the IOM suggested a goal of 
reducing healthcare errors by fifty percent over five years. IOM, TO ERR IS 
HUMAN, supra note 4, at 4. That goal went unachieved. AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
AHRQ Pub. No. 08-0040, 2007 NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT, at 
iv, 2 (2008). 
 24. CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 23, at 5–7. As will be seen, a sound 
mistake-proofing program should include procedures and techniques designed 
to prevent medication errors, which occur with surprising frequency. See infra 
text accompanying notes 197–203, 256–257. 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 114–121, 259–263. 
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there is no true national system of accountability with suffi-
cient quality transparency to enable healthcare consumers and 
regulators to identify HCPs that commit abnormally large 
numbers of errors and to create pressure for change.26 
In addition, fear of legal liability serves as an impediment 
to widespread adoption of mistake-proofing processes. The con-
cern is that the implementation of mistake-proofing might be 
used as evidence that such actions were possible but that HCPs 
delayed in their implementation, with harm coming to the pa-
tient in the meantime.27 As will be seen, that concern is largely 
unwarranted because of a key rule of evidence.28 But to the ex-
tent that the concern is there, it serves as an obstacle. Further, 
even when mistake-proofing has been implemented, HCPs may 
be reluctant to acknowledge the use of mistake-proofing and 
share knowledge gained through its use with other HCPs.29 
The fear is that such disclosure will result in enhanced expec-
tations of quality and an attendant greater propensity for pa-
tients to bring malpractice lawsuits.30 That fear, too, is largely 
off the mark31 but still serves as an impediment to broader use 
of mistake-proofing measures. 
This article addresses the key role that mistake-proofing 
processes would play in medical error reduction if such process-
es were widely adopted. It also proposes ways in which obsta-
cles to broad adoption may be ameliorated or eliminated. Part 
II examines the nature, frequency, and severity of medical er-
rors and provides background on the legal treatment extended 
to them. Part III focuses on the causes of medical errors. In 
Part IV, the article discusses mistake-proofing approaches and 
principles and outlines particular applications to healthcare. 
Part V examines impediments to the use of mistake-
proofing techniques in healthcare. Some of these impediments 
stem from a misunderstanding among healthcare providers 
                                                          
 26. See infra note 115; infra text accompanying notes 259–263. 
 27. GROUT, supra note 17, at 17. 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 207–231. 
 29. See GROUT, supra note 17, at 18 (highlighting the presence of many 
examples of mistake-proofing solutions and approaches in the manufacturing 
arena but the lack of available examples of mistake-proofing in the healthcare 
field). 
 30. See id. at 17–18 (explaining that the contributors to the article of mis-
take-proofing examples wanted to remain anonymous, so as to not create lia-
bility). 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 207–231, 237–238. 
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about whether taking mistake-proofing steps somehow damag-
es their interests and positions in litigation over alleged medi-
cal errors. In Part VI, this article offers recommendations for 
increasing the use of mistake-proofing innovations in 
healthcare and for overcoming the impediments to their broad 
adoption. 
II. NATURE OF MEDICAL ERRORS AND LEGAL 
TREATMENT THEREOF 
This section considers fundamental legal principles that 
must be grasped if the desirability of mistake-proofing medi-
cine is to be fully understood. Any discussion of medical errors 
and the legal treatment they receive must begin with the 
recognition that the occurrence of an adverse medical event—
an instance in which treatment administered to a patient 
yielded a bad outcome—does not necessarily mean that a medi-
cal error was committed.32 What, then, is a medical error, and 
when does it furnish the basis for legal liability? 
Medical error may be defined as an HCP’s act of “commis-
sion or . . . omission . . . that would have been judged wrong by 
skilled and knowledgeable peers at the time it occurred.”33 Lia-
bility may be imposed on the HCP (or HCPs) when the error 
caused the patient to experience a harmful outcome.34 The im-
mediately preceding statements regarding actionable medical 
errors contemplate the controlling effect of negligence princi-
ples, which govern most instances of liability in the healthcare 
                                                          
 32. See e.g., KENNETH R. WING, LAW AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 291–92 
(6th ed. 2003) (pointing out that very few adverse events implicate the res ipsa 
loquitar doctrine). The flipside is also true—i.e., not all medical errors result 
in harm to the patient. 
 33. Albert W. Wu et al., To Tell the Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in 
Disclosing Medical Mistakes to Patients, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 770, 770 
(1997). Given the process nature of healthcare, the key question for liability 
purposes will often be whether an HCP’s actions or omissions deviated so 
much from those that are usual and customary as to constitute a “process var-
iation.” JOHN D. BANJA, MEDICAL ERRORS AND MEDICAL NARCISSISM 6 (2005). 
 34. E.g., J. STUART SHOWALTER, THE LAW OF HEALTHCARE 
ADMINISTRATION 40–41 (4th ed. 2004) (illustrating the deference given to de-
cisions by medical professionals); WING, supra note 32, at 291–92 (stating that 
a patient must be able to show both actual and proximate causation for the 
harmful outcome to establish liability for negligence). Because legal principles 
focus on the intersection of an error and an adverse event in which patient 
harm occurs, it may be useful to characterize potential liability-triggering in-
stances as preventable adverse events. Saul N. Weingart, The Nature of Error 
in Health Care, Presentation at Harvard Medical School Seminar: Progress in 
Patient Safety (Nov. 2008) (notes on file with authors). 
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arena and many instances of liability in other professional or 
business-oriented contexts.35 
A. NEGLIGENCE AND THE REASONABLE-CARE FOCUS 
Negligence cases revolve around the proposition that the 
defendant failed to fulfill a duty of reasonable care owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff, with the plaintiff suffering harm as a 
result.36 The reasonable-care concept calls for the actions or in-
actions of the defendant to be measured against those of the 
hypothetical reasonable person of ordinary prudence.37 The 
plaintiff will seek to demonstrate that a reasonable person 
would not have done what the defendant did, or would have 
done what the defendant failed to do.38 If the plaintiff proves 
such a breach of duty on the part of the defendant and demon-
strates the existence of a sufficient causation link between the 
defendant’s failure to use reasonable care and the harm experi-
enced by the plaintiff, the defendant will be held liable for neg-
ligence.39 
The basic negligence principles outlined in the preceding 
paragraph are applied in a very broad range of settings.40 The 
myriad of potential applications of negligence principles in-
clude, for instance, the product liability context. Manufacturers 
may face liability if they adopted a product design that sub-
stantially increased the risk of harm to product users (includ-
ing the injured plaintiff) and was a design that reasonable 
manufacturers would not adopt.41 Similarly, negligence liability 
                                                          
 35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A & cmts. a–c (1965) 
(“[O]ne who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or 
trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by 
members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communi-
ties.”). 
 36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35, §§ 281 cmt. c, illus. 
1–3, cmt. e, 283 cmts. b–c, 284 cmt. a, 285 cmts. e–f, cmt. g & illus. 1–7, 289 
cmt. j, illus. 5–6, cmt. k, illus. 7–8, cmt. m, illus. 9–14. 
 37. WING, supra note 32, at 290–91. 
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35, §§ 282–83, 284, 
299A (defining the standard for reasonable behavior, which may include either 
an act or a failure to act). 
 39. Id. §§ 281–83, 328A–B. 
 40. See, e.g., id. §§ 281 cmt. c, illus. 1–3, cmt. e, 283 cmts. b–c, 284 cmt. a, 
285 cmts. e–f, cmt. g & illus. 1–7, 289 cmt. j, illus. 5–6, cmt. k, illus. 7–8, cmt. 
m, illus. 9–14, 299A cmts. a–e. 
 41. See id. §§ 298 cmt. b, 299 & cmt. e, 299A & cmts. a–e, 300 & cmt. c; see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1 cmt. a, 2(b)–
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may follow if a manufacturer utilized a production process that 
a reasonable manufacturer would not employ, and the process 
led to an injury-causing product defect.42 
The professional liability context is another one of the 
many settings to which negligence principles are applied. Alt-
hough the term “malpractice” is often used when a harmed pa-
tient sues a physician or other HCP, or when an aggrieved cli-
ent sues an attorney, negligence is the legal theory that nearly 
always controls the case.43 In the healthcare context, the key 
questions are whether the HCP acted as a reasonable HCP44 
would have under the circumstances, and if not, whether that 
failure to exercise due care caused—or helped to cause—the 
harm suffered by the plaintiff.45 
For example, assuming the existence of the causation link 
just noted, a physician could be at risk of liability if she adopted 
a course of treatment that a similarly situated reasonable phy-
sician would not adopt.46 The same would be true if the physi-
cian failed to diagnose a patient’s serious illness until long after 
a reasonable physician would have made the diagnosis.47 Con-
sider, too, the example of the nurse who failed to follow a physi-
cian’s orders regarding a patient’s treatment (something the 
reasonable nurse would not do, absent extraordinary and com-
pelling circumstances). If the patient suffered harm as a result, 
the nurse could face negligence liability.48 So might a nurse 
who fails to pick up on obvious signs of patient distress when a 
                                                          
(c) cmts. a, b (1998). 
 42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35, §§ 298 cmt. b, 
299 & cmt. e, 299A & cmts. a–e, 300 & cmt. c; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (1998). 
 43. E.g., WING, supra note 32, at 290–91. Seldom do malpractice cases 
present claims of intentional or reckless wrongdoing, as opposed to negligence. 
John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and 
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 621 (2005) 
(discussing implications of caps on damages in medical malpractice cases). 
 44. The previously noted definition of medical error, see supra text ac-
companying note 33, applies this “reasonable HCP” concept by comparing 
what the HCP under scrutiny did or did not do to what “skilled and knowl-
edgeable peers” would or would not have done. Hill, Langvardt & Massey, su-
pra note 2, at 165–66; Wu et al., supra note 33, at 770. 
 45. Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 165–68. 
 46. E.g., SHOWALTER, supra note 34, at 40–43 (reviewing the reasonable 
physician standard, the locality rule, the school rule, and reasonable prudence 
standard). 
 47. E.g., Jones v. Speed, 577 A.2d 64, 67–70 (Md. 1990) (brain tumor). 
 48. See JAMES WALKER SMITH, HOSPITAL LIABILITY §§ 4.04[1], 10.05[1][a], 
11.02[2]–[3], 11.04[1] (rev. ed. 2005). 
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reasonable nurse would have noted such signs and reacted ac-
cordingly.49 Of course, these same principles apply to individual 
HCPs other than doctors and nurses if they cause harm to pa-
tients through actions or inactions that fall below the due-care 
standard appropriate to their position.50 
It is important to recall, however, that the mere proof of a 
bad outcome for a patient is not by itself sufficient for the im-
position of negligence liability on HCPs involved in the pa-
tient’s care.51 After all, the HCPs may have provided the nature 
and type of treatment that was reasonable under the circum-
stances. In such a situation, there is no breach of duty and thus 
no basis for negligence liability, despite the bad outcome.52 
B. IMPUTED LIABILITY AND DIRECT LIABILITY 
The previously noted examples of malpractice liability in-
volved individual defendants such as doctors and nurses. Of 
course, hospitals and other organizational HCPs may also face 
liability. One of two grounds, and sometimes both grounds, may 
be used to establish liability. The first method is imputed liabil-
ity under respondeat superior, a doctrine that calls for the hos-
pital or other organizational defendant to be held liable for the 
negligence of its employees if that negligence occurred within 
the scope of employment.53 The other method is direct liability, 
under which the organizational HCP is held liable for its own 
failure to use reasonable care.54 
Consider, for instance, the previously noted examples of 
negligence on the part of a nurse in caring for a patient. As-
                                                          
 49. See id. § 11.02[2]–[3]. 
 50. WING, supra note 32, at 289–91 (explaining the different standard of 
conduct that is applied to medical professionals). As will be seen, an institu-
tional HCP such as a hospital may face liability as well in some such instanc-
es. See infra text accompanying notes 53–60. 
 51. See WING, supra note 32, at 291–93 (emphasizing that the patient 
must be able to show a breach of the duty of care by the HCP and also must 
show both actual and proximate causation). 
 52. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35, §§ 281, 283, 
328A. Of course, a lawsuit may still be filed in such an instance—particularly 
if the outcome is extremely bad—but there should be no liability if there was 
no failure to use reasonable care. 
 53. SMITH, supra note 48, § 3.01–02. The same rule applies with regard to 
employers generally. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). 
 54. Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 166 & n.40 (explaining the 
corporate negligence doctrine that provides for direct liability of hospitals). 
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suming that the nurse was an employee of a hospital or another 
organizational HCP, the nurse would not be the only liable par-
ty. The hospital or other organizational HCP serving as the 
nurse’s employer would also be liable on an imputed basis un-
der respondeat superior.55 In such scenarios, the employer is 
not really at fault; the employee is. However, the public policy 
considerations underlying respondeat superior support a rule 
that the employer—normally the recipient of the benefit of an 
employee’s service—may have to bear some of the burdens as-
sociated with the employee’s mistakes.56 
In other situations, the hospital or other organizational 
HCP may be at fault and therefore may face direct liability for 
its own negligence. Assume, for example, that a hospital’s es-
tablished procedure regarding administration of narcotics 
proves inadequate to prevent a dosage error and the resulting 
harm to a patient. The hospital is likely to be held directly lia-
ble for negligence if a reasonable hospital would have adopted a 
different procedure that substantially reduced the risk of harm 
to patients.57 The “would have adopted a different [procedure]” 
statement is important, because it underscores the key role 
that the failure to take certain precautionary actions may play 
in furnishing the basis for negligence liability.58 
The above discussion suggests two important and often re-
lated characteristics of many instances of negligence liability in 
                                                          
 55. SMITH, supra note 48, § 3.01–02. The respondeat superior rule is more 
likely to serve as a basis for the hospital to be held liable when the negligent 
person was a nurse than when he or she was a physician. Id. Nurses are typi-
cally employees, whereas physicians usually are independent contractors with 
hospital admission privileges. If the physician is an independent contractor, 
respondeat superior would not make the hospital liable. Id. Of course, a physi-
cian who is a hospital employee (e.g., a hospitalist), respondeat superior would 
come into play and would expose the hospital to liability in the event of the 
employee’s negligence. See id. 
 56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219, 228–229 (1958) (limit-
ing the employer’s liability to actions performed by the employee within the 
scope of employment). 
 57. See SMITH, supra note 48, § 3.03[1]. The “corporate negligence” con-
templated here may take a variety of forms, with the hospital being held liable 
for its own failure to use reasonable care (not, as in the respondeat superior 
setting, for its employees’ negligence). SHOWALTER, supra note 34, at 129; 
SMITH, supra note 48, § 3.03[1]. Of course, depending upon the facts of the 
particular case, it is possible that a hospital could face both direct liability for 
its own negligence and respondeat superior liability because its employees 
were negligent as well. See id. §§ 3.01–02, 3.03[1]. 
 58. SHOWALTER, supra note 34, at 129 (focusing on failures to provide ad-
equate accommodations and facilities); SMITH, supra note 48, § 3.03[1]. 
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healthcare settings: the group errors characteristic and the sys-
tem errors characteristic. Medical errors that give rise to negli-
gence liability often involve the actions of more than one party, 
as opposed to a single HCP who fails to exercise reasonable 
care.59 To take an example of an egregious error, consider the 
surgeon who amputates the patient’s right leg instead of the 
left. The surgeon presumably failed to use reasonable care. But 
other HCPs involved in the patient’s care during the pre-
operative stage may well have failed to take reasonable steps to 
help ensure that the correct leg was amputated. In that sense, 
the medical mistake was a group error. Depending on the facts, 
it may also be a system error. If, for instance, the hospital did 
not have a simple policy requiring clear pre-surgery marking of 
the body part, we can add to the mix a system error that makes 
the hospital directly liable in addition to individual HCPs who 
were negligent.60 
Because negligence liability is premised on harm-causing 
mistakes that fall below the standard of due care, mistake-
proofing efforts of the sort discussed in this article make a 
great deal of sense in the healthcare environment. They are de-
signed to lessen the likelihood of harm-causing medical errors, 
and they relate directly to the individual-error, group-error, 
and system-error aspects of the negligence liability environ-
ment faced by HCPs. Moreover, they typically do not carry a 
hefty price tag and are relatively easy to implement.61 But 
HCPs have not adopted such processes as broadly as might be 
expected. Later parts of the article will address reasons for this 
state of affairs and propose ways to expand the use of mistake-
proofing processes. First, however, we devote further attention 
in the following part to the causes of medical errors. 
III. CAUSES OF MEDICAL ERRORS 
A. THREE INTERTWINED CONSIDERATIONS 
Given the high cost of healthcare in the United States, why 
do medical errors occur with such frequency? Three often inter-
                                                          
 59. See infra text accompanying notes 194–203. 
 60. See SHOWALTER, supra note 34, at 129 (including institutional errors 
as a basis for negligence); SMITH, supra note 48, §§ 3.01–02, 3.03[1]; see also 
supra notes 55, 57 (discussing respondeat superior liability and direct liability 
for corporate negligence). 
 61. See infra text accompanying notes 172–193. 
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twined considerations are notable. First, most errors are multi-
factorial and often involve both cognitive/knowledge and sys-
tem/process failures.62 Second, most care is delivered through a 
series of frequently complex processes that are often plagued 
with a lack of consistency and a cultural dependence upon indi-
viduals.63 These considerations lead to variability in the quality 
of delivery.64 Third, medicine involves both art and science and 
requires subjective judgment, especially in the art component.65 
Given that subjectivity, the predominant culture influences 
both behaviors and outcomes.66 Underlying the medical culture 
is a host of behavioral issues that contribute to medical errors 
through various psychological and epistemological influences.67 
When combined with the customary defensive responses by 
HCPs to systemic failure and the absence of a comprehensive, 
centralized system for measuring, tracking, and reporting er-
rors, the three considerations identified above operate as barri-
ers to reducing the incidence of medical errors. We now exam-
ine those considerations in more depth. 
Most systems of complex, intrinsically hazardous processes 
are accompanied by defenses against failure. After “repeated 
experiences with failure . . . [,] system designers and opera-
tors . . . [usually] implement layers of defense[s] or redundancy 
so that an error will be intercepted and its trajectory halted” 
before harm results.68 Nonetheless, no matter how well-
designed processes are, some latent errors will still occur.69 A 
key question that surfaces is whether the error was systemic 
or, instead, the result of one person failing in some essential re-
spect (“single-point failure”).70 In the healthcare context, such 
                                                          
 62. Gordon Schiff, Understanding Diagnostic Errors, Presentation at 
Harvard Medical School Seminar: Progress in Patient Safety (Nov. 2008) (on 
file with authors). 
 63. GROUT, supra note 17, at 19 (calling the reliance on individual perfec-
tion a perpetuation of a “myth of infallibility”). 
 64. Id. (lacking consistent processes inhibits the implementation of mis-
take-proofing). 
 65. See RICHMOND & FEIN, supra note 8, at 68 (stating that discretion is 
involved in medical decisions). 
 66. Id. 
 67. BANJA, supra note 33, at 15–16 (analogizing the topic of medical errors 
to a spider web). 
 68. Id. at 11. 
 69. Id. at 12. 
 70. See id. (distinguishing between system failures and individual errors 
will not only establish liability, but it will also provide more focused correc-
tion). 
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determinations become important for legal purposes because of 
the manner in which teams providing medical care are struc-
tured. 
In most settings, teams make fewer mistakes than do indi-
viduals, especially when all members of a team are cognizant of 
each individual member’s responsibilities.71 It is important to 
note that medical teams are often formed temporarily from var-
ious sources for single episodes of care. Some who become part 
of the team for a given episode may be independent contractors 
rather than employees of the healthcare facility where care is 
provided. Physicians in a particular medical practice may fur-
nish services as team members in a number of diverse contexts. 
The members of these teams, however, are rarely trained to-
gether.72 They also may come from different disciplines and ed-
ucational backgrounds.73 Further, team training in the medical 
profession tends to be limited and insufficiently grounded in a 
scientific understanding of the human factors that influence ef-
fective teamwork.74 It may also be haphazard.75 For example, 
physicians frequently do not have a good grasp of how hospitals 
function.76 
At a more macro level, many hospitals have not focused on 
error prevention. One hospital chief executive officer reportedly 
stated that patient safety was not “on his radar screen” and de-
scribed his job as “feeding the beast” (i.e., generating reve-
nues).77 Noting this lack of focus on error prevention and reduc-
tion, a study that gave rise to a New England Journal of 
Medicine article revealed troubling statistics. An estimated 
3.7% of patients admitted to hospitals experience an adverse 
event, 27.6% of these adverse events result from negligence, 
and in approximately 25% of the negligently caused adverse 
                                                          
 71. D.P. BAKER ET AL., MEDICAL TEAMWORK AND PATIENT SAFETY: THE 
EVIDENCE-BASED RELATION 29 (2005). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 43. 
 75. See id. at 47 (calling for either a national error reporting system or 
requiring participation in team training programs). 
 76. Leape, supra note 19. A floor comment by one physician during a med-
ical seminar regarding the absence of teamwork is telling: “As someone work-
ing in the hospital, I don’t know what is going on. So much of the time no one 
knows what is going on.” Weingart, supra note 34 (floor comment during 
presentation). 
 77. Weingart, supra note 34. 
LANGVARDT_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2013  11:38 AM 
2013] MISTAKE-PROOFING MEDICINE 403 
events, the patient dies.78 These results led to the conclusion 
that “there is a substantial amount of injury to patients from 
medical management, and many injuries are the result of sub-
standard care.”79 Further, the problem of patient safety outside 
the hospital setting is said to be as great as inside hospitals.80 
B. MEDICAL ERROR AND BEHAVIORAL UNDERPINNINGS 
No discussion of the nature of medical error would be com-
plete without some recognition of its behavioral underpin-
nings.81 In examining the psychology of medical error, insights 
can be gleaned from a triad of cognitive models of human per-
formance. Performance can be skill-based, rule-based, or 
knowledge-based.82 Skilled-based performance often involves 
unconscious, rapid, and effortless responses to demands.83 
Rule-based performance involves the application of some algo-
rithm or finite sequence of instructions, such as “if X occurs, 
then do Y.” Knowledge-based performance involves the use of 
novel problem-solving skills.84 
Skill-based errors generally fall within the category of 
what might be termed slips.85 Slips can be subcategorized to er-
rors involving capture (familiarity with a similar behavior 
overrides the appropriate behavior), description (similarity in 
physical appearance or proximity of a wrong object to the cor-
rect object causes the wrong choice of behavior), associative ac-
tivation (actor becomes distracted from task at hand), or loss of 
activation (actor forgets purpose of the behavior).86 Rule-based 
                                                          
 78. T.A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in 
Hospitalized Patients: Results of Harvard Medical Practice Study, 324 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 370, 371, 373 (1991) (reporting results of a study analyzing ran-
domly sampled hospital records from New York hospitals). 
 79. Id. at 370. 
 80. David W. Bates, Welcoming Remarks at Harvard Medical School Sem-
inar: Progress in Patient Safety (Nov. 3–4, 2008) (on file with authors). 
 81. For a detailed discussion of the cognitive influences on preventable 
adverse events, see Jiajie Zhang et al., A Cognitive Taxonomy of Medical Er-
rors, 37 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 193, 193–202 (2004). 
 82. The Psychology of Human Error, HUM. FACTORS MD (June 8, 2010), 
http://www.humanfactorsmd.com/psychology-of-human-error/. 
 83. See id. (classifying skills as automatic). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (occurring typically when an individual’s attention is diverted). 
 86. Weingart, supra note 34. An example of a capture error is “when a 
nurse misprograms a new infusion pump because the sequence of steps is sim-
ilar, but not identical to the pump he is most familiar with.” The Psychology of 
Human Error, supra note 82. “[W]hen the wrong control on an EKG is adjust-
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and knowledge-based errors are often termed mistakes.87 Rule-
based errors occur when the wrong rule is applied.88 
Knowledge-based mistakes may occur because of various com-
mon thinking tendencies. These include: memory biases (in-
cluding such ones as choice-supportive bias, the recall of prior 
options chosen over options rejected); availability heuristics 
(predicting the frequency of an event based upon how easily an 
example can be brought to mind); confirmation bias (a tendency 
to search for or interpret new information in a way that con-
firms one’s prior preferences or attitudes); and overconfidence 
(having greater faith in one’s knowledge or ability than is war-
ranted).89 Each of these factors can lead to erroneous decisions 
and actions in the healthcare setting. 
The problem of impaired providers sometimes also contrib-
utes to the causation of preventable adverse events. Impaired 
providers are those physicians or other medical personnel who 
are unable to fulfill their professional responsibilities properly 
because of physical or psychological illness or because of sub-
stance abuse.90 Evidence indicates that between eight and fif-
teen percent of providers are impaired in one or more of the 
senses just noted (a figure similar to what is found in the gen-
eral population).91 Substance abuse problems and behavioral 
disorders92 can interfere with healthcare quality in various 
ways. For example, an HCP’s substance abuse can lead to a 
failure to record important information in a patient’s chart and 
eventual harm to the patient, as well as severely compromising 
the affected HCP’s ability to exercise sound medical judg-
                                                          
ed because it’s close to other controls that look the same” is an example of a 
descriptive error. Id. When a “radiologist[] forget[s] what he is looking for after 
retrieving and displaying a comparison study” qualifies as a loss of activation 
error. Id. 
 87. The Psychology of Human Error, supra note 82. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Weingart, supra note 34. 
 90. Booker T. Bush, The Physician Who Becomes Impaired, Presentation 
at Harvard Medical School Seminar: Progress in Patient Safety (Nov. 2008) 
(on file with authors). 
 91. Id. 
 92. These may include, for instance, boundary violations such as selling 
drug samples or engaging in sexual relations with co-workers, disruptive be-
haviors such as throwing scalpels and yelling at other members of the medical 
team, and even outright dishonesty such as taking advantage of patients for 
financial gain. Id. 
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ment.93 Disruptive behaviors can adversely affect morale and 
create workplace frictions.94 The result may be an unhealthy 
culture that enhances the risk of error on the part of distracted 
or intimidated individuals or, as the following discussion indi-
cates, undermines checks against error.95 
C. OTHER CAUSES OF MEDICAL ERRORS 
Contemporary research suggests that catastrophic patient-
care adverse events usually involve various people “committing 
multiple, often seemingly innocuous, mistakes that . . . breach 
an organization’s fail-safe mechanisms.”96 In an environment 
such as the frequently chaotic team setting in healthcare, the 
likelihood of errors increases because the lack of a sound organ-
izational culture results in compliance failures becoming nor-
malized.97 The causes of such normalization of corrupted prac-
                                                          
 93. In other instances, there may have been no substance abuse on the 
part of a provider of medical services but the provider may be similarly im-
paired for a simple reason: fatigue. The problem of provider fatigue may help 
to answer a question posed by a physician commentator: “Why are so many 
mistakes made doing things that are routine in medicine?” Christopher P. 
Landrigan, Fatigue and Error: Achieving Evidence-Based Schedule Improve-
ments, Presentation at Harvard Medical School Seminar: Progress in Patient 
Safety (Nov. 2008) (on file with authors). There is empirical evidence that phy-
sicians’ often exhaustive work schedules contribute to the incidence of medical 
errors. See Njib T. Ayas et al., Extended Work Duration and the Risk of Self-
Reported Percutaneous Injuries in Interns, 296 JAMA 1055, 1059–60 (2006) 
(finding that extended work hours were associated with an increased risk of 
percutaneous injuries); Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Effect of Reducing In-
terns’ Work Hours on Serious Medical Errors in Intensive Care Units, 351 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1838, 1838–39, 1842–44 (2004) (finding that interns made thirty-
five percent more medical errors of a serious nature, and five times more diag-
nostic errors, on a traditional work schedule than on a schedule reflecting re-
duced work hours). Despite promulgation of standards for work hours by the 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), there is far 
from universal compliance with the standards. Christopher P. Landrigan et 
al., Interns’ Compliance with Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Edu-
cation Work-Hour Limits, 296 JAMA 1063, 1063–64, 1065–66 (2006) (“83.6% of 
participating interns reported working hours that were noncompliant with the 
ACGME duty-hour standards . . . .”). Given the busy schedules of many physi-
cians, it seems likely that fatigue may also be a problem well after they com-
plete their training. 
 94. Bush, supra note 90. 
 95. Id. 
 96. John Banja, The Normalization of Deviance in Health Care Delivery, 
53 BUS. HORIZONS 139, 139 (2010). 
 97. See id. at 139–41 (noticing that the normalized behavior may not di-
rectly cause harm, but potentially creates a weakness in the system when a 
future error does occur). 
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tices are found in the phenomena of socialization, institutional-
ization, and rationalization.98 Socialization, usually mediated 
by an informal system of rewards and punishments, operates to 
determine when an organizational newcomer is fully accepted 
into a particular group.99 Institutionalization exposes newcom-
ers to deviant behaviors, often performed by authority fig-
ures.100 Rationalization enables participants in care delivery 
systems to convince themselves and others that departures 
from compliant practices are not only legitimate but often even 
necessary to ensure proper care.101 
Earlier discussion noted that negligence liability may be 
imposed when a medical error results from a failure to use rea-
sonable care.102 Despite this prospect of liability, the tort sys-
tem has not effectively coerced HCPs into creating, implement-
ing, and enforcing the effective use of mistake-proofing 
principles and techniques. One reason may be a characteristic 
of some physicians’ psyche: a narcissism that blocks full ac-
                                                          
 98. Id. at 141. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. Common noncompliant practices in patient care settings include: 
“not washing or sanitizing hands sufficiently; not gowning up or skipping some 
other infection-control procedures; not changing gloves when appropriate; fail-
ing to check armbands; not performing safety checks; using abbreviations; not 
getting required approval before acting; and violating policies on storing or 
dispensing medications.” Id. at 140. In an example of normalization of a de-
parture from standard practice in a surgical setting, a medical student observ-
ing a surgery reported that: 
[T]he surgeon inadvertently touched the tip of the instrument he was 
using to his plastic face mask. Instead of his requesting or being of-
fered a sterile replacement, he just froze for a few seconds while eve-
ryone else in the operating room stared at him. The surgeon then con-
tinued operating. Five minutes later he did it again and still no one 
did anything. 
Id. When the medical student later asked a nurse about what had happened, 
the nurse called it “no big deal” and added that “[w]e’ll just load the patient 
with antibiotics and he’ll do fine.” Id. The patient was given antibiotics and 
did recover well. Id. However, tragic results—a patient’s death—occurred in 
an instance involving a combination of an individual’s mistake and a noncom-
pliant act by others. After turning off a surgical patient’s ventilator because 
the surgeon wanted to take an x-ray, an anesthesiologist forgot to turn the 
ventilator back on for significantly longer than the few seconds the ventilator 
was to be off. Id. at 140–41. It was later discovered that an alarm meant to 
alert the anesthesiologist regarding the ventilator problem had been disabled, 
“possibly because the operating room staff found the constant beeping [of the 
alarm] irritating and annoying.” Id. at 141. 
 102. See supra text accompanying notes 36–52. 
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ceptance of the notion that compliance rules apply to physi-
cians. Long recognized as the most dominant players in care 
delivery,103 physicians are also very much in a position to dom-
inate the culture of care delivery. This power, if coupled with a 
narcissistic tendency, may lead to feelings of arrogance and be-
ing “special.”104 
In addition, physicians are trained in a culture in which 
disclosure of errors—even to peers—is regarded as an indica-
tion of weakness.105 This makes admission of errors difficult. 
Physicians are naturally inclined to import their feelings and 
proclivities into practice settings.106 When this tendency is 
combined with physicians’ dominant positions in care delivery, 
there emerges fertile ground for a culture that resists error 
admission and causal identification. One physician has stated 
that narcissism led him to believe he had total control, to at-
tribute his mistakes to others, to refuse to resolve tensions with 
others, to reject new ideas, and to cling rigidly to his original 
attitudes.107 He saw the same tendencies, beliefs, and behaviors 
in other physicians.108 Given the gravity and high stakes often 
associated with the healthcare setting, rationalizing and not 
acknowledging their mistakes may offer physicians a relief 
from the angst that error disclosure could create.109 It therefore 
stands to reason that the threat of legal liability is somewhat 
limited in its ability to curb mistakes and cause behavioral 
changes in people who externalize blame rather than admit 
mistakes. 
The prospect of avoiding negligence liability has not had 
the seemingly logical effect of spurring HCPs to adopt mistake-
proofing processes on a wider scale. However, concern about po-
                                                          
 103. See Andrew K. Dolan, Antitrust Law and Physician Dominance of 
Other Health Practitioners, 4 J. HEALTH POL’Y 675, 679 (1980) (discussing the 
dominant position physicians are in when controlling the approval of applica-
tions for hospital privileges); see also Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, 
NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 44 (noting the incentive doctors have to priori-
tize financial gains over patient-centered care). 
 104. BANJA, supra note 33, at 50 (listing the DSM-IV traits for the narcis-
sistic personality disorder). 
 105. Id. at 29. 
 106. Cf. id. at 15 (acknowledging that doctors’ thoughts and feelings impact 
their communication with patients). 
 107. Id. at 54. 
 108. See id. (suggesting that similar behavior is encouraged in other doc-
tors). 
 109. Id. at 47 (attempting to avoid liability). 
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tential liability prompts many physicians to engage in what 
they call “defensive medicine”—ordering tests and procedures 
they would not otherwise order because of the fear of being 
sued if they do not order those tests and procedures.110 Defen-
sive medicine has been estimated to cause, on a national basis, 
seventy billion dollars per year in unnecessary treatment 
costs.111 As will be seen in later analysis, the actual need to en-
gage in such defensive medicine likely is not as great as many 
physicians perceive it to be. This erroneous perception may re-
sult from a misunderstanding concerning what negligence law 
really provides and from physicians’ overestimation of their 
chances of being sued, let alone being held liable.112 Rather 
than being preoccupied with the supposed need to engage in de-
fensive medicine, HCPs would do far more to protect them-
selves against liability by making greater use of mistake-
proofing processes and techniques.113 
The failure of medicine to make substantial progress in re-
ducing medical errors across most of its disciplines114 can also 
                                                          
 110. David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Spe-
cialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 
2609 (2005) (differentiating between “positive” and “negative” defensive medi-
cine). Various commentators have noted the defensive medicine concerns held 
by critics of the current legal regime. E.g., William P. Gunnar, Is There an Ac-
ceptable Answer to Rising Medical Malpractice Premiums?, 13 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 465, 476–77 (2004) (“Physicians have come to believe that every 
patient is a potential lawsuit.”). Other commentators regard the defensive 
medicine concerns as overblown. E.g., Kenneth C. Chessick & Matthew D. 
Robinson, Medical Negligence Litigation Is Not the Problem, 26 N. ILL. L. REV. 
563, 570, 574 (2006) (emphasizing that “insurance companies are paying out 
less in claims each year, despite charging more in premiums” and that defen-
sive medicine is not a shield from liability); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, 
The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability 
Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 937–38 
(2005) (“The difficulty in proving the causal link between malpractice exposure 
and higher levels of defensive medicine arises from the multitude of motives 
providers may have for performing ‘unnecessary’ tests and procedures . . . .”). 
For further analysis of the supposed defensive medicine problem, see infra 
text accompanying notes 232–241. 
 111. MASS. MED. SOC’Y, INVESTIGATION OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 1 (2008). 
 112. See infra text accompanying note 237. 
 113. See infra text accompanying note 239. 
 114. However, anesthesiology serves as an example of mistake-proofing be-
ing applied in a medical discipline with great success. See Hyman & Silver, 
supra note 110, at 917–23. Anesthesia safety improved significantly after a 
professional body promulgated patient monitoring guidelines and anesthesiol-
ogists implemented them. See id. at 920. As a further result, anesthesiologists’ 
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be attributed, in part, to the absence of a national entity suffi-
ciently empowered to engage in comprehensive tracking of 
HCPs’ adoption, or lack of adoption, of safety measures.115 More 
than half of the states require reporting of medical errors,116 
but meaningful reduction in the number of errors remains an 
                                                          
insurance premiums remained relatively flat (unlike those of other special-
ties). See id. at 918. This suggests that mistake-proofing can be helpful in re-
ducing HCPs’ oft-voiced complaints about the costs of malpractice insurance. 
See Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 159. There remains a question, 
however, about why other medical specialties have not embraced mistake-
proofing principles and techniques to achieve similar results. Hyman & Silver 
note that “[m]any providers have failed to adopt patient safety measures of 
proven effectiveness, and they have similarly failed to use information already 
in their possession to protect patients from harm.” Hyman & Silver, supra 
note 110, at 991. 
 115. This is not to say that the federal government has ignored patient 
safety issues. Federal law calls for the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) to develop a “national strategy to improve the delivery of health 
care services, patient health outcomes, and population health.” 42 U.S.C. § 
280j (2006). Ways of improving healthcare quality are among the matters to be 
addressed in that strategy. Id. An agency housed within HHS, the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), engages in educational efforts con-
sistent with its name and seeks to promote quality enhancements through re-
ports and recommendations. See Advancing Excellence in Healthcare, AGENCY 
FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/ (last visited Sept. 29, 
2012); see also, e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, NATIONAL 
HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT (2012), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/ 
qual/nhqr11/nhqr11.pdf (annual report issued by AHRQ); GROUT, supra note 
17, at 1 (AHRQ-sponsored report); AHRQ Innovations Exchange, AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY , http://www.innovations.ahrq.gov/(last visited 
Sept. 29, 2012) (AHRQ-provided tips). The Patient Safety and Quality Im-
provement Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to 26 (2006), calls for an AHRQ-
administered process by which public or private organizations may choose to 
form patient safety organizations (PSOs). Id. §§ 299b-21, 24. HCPs participat-
ing in PSOs may choose to provide the PSOs confidential reports on medical 
errors and events that bear adversely on patient safety, with such reports be-
ing barred from discovery and evidentiary use in cases in which plaintiffs at-
tempt to have the HCPs held liable for the alleged errors. Id. § 299b-22. The 
PSOs then report such information for inclusion, on an anonymous basis, in 
databases designed to lead to the enhancement of health quality and patient 
safety. Id. §§ 299b-23 to 24.  See generally Patient Safety Organizations and 
Patient Safety Work Product, 42 C.F.R. § 3 (2009) (listing regulations promul-
gated pursuant to Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 in or-
der to implement statute). These efforts are both useful and commendable, but 
the voluntary nature of both PSO creation and error-reporting by HCPs means 
that the information acquired by the AHRQ and available for inclusion in the 
databases is less complete, and therefore less useful, than it might be. 
 116. See National Survey, supra note 5, at 207, 213. For discussion of such 
statutes, their similarities, and their differences, see id. at 213–22. Details of 
the state error-reporting systems are beyond the scope of this article. 
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elusive goal.117 The usefulness of the information obtained 
through the state error-reporting systems that do exist is im-
paired by chronic under-reporting of errors.118 Moreover, there 
is no comprehensive national system of mandatory error-
reporting,119 despite recommendations by the IOM and com-
mentators that such a system be adopted.120 It therefore be-
comes difficult to track progress in error reduction even if such 
progress is being made.121 
As the foregoing discussion has revealed, medical errors 
stem from various causes, including complex processes, chaotic 
team environments, behavioral factors, and imperfect defensive 
measures. Moreover, those measures fail because of several fac-
tors, including flawed institutional cultures that undermine 
safeguards, physician narcissism that may create a resistance 
to quality improvements, and the absence of a well-coordinated, 
centralized system of error reporting and safety improvement 
tracking. What, then, can be done to improve healthcare quali-
ty? The following section turns to the potentially efficacious 
remedy of applying mistake-proofing theory and techniques to 
reduce the incidence of preventable adverse events. 
IV. MISTAKE-PROOFING: ATTRIBUTES AND 
APPLICATIONS TO HEALTHCARE 
Citing examples of “normalized-deviance” situations in 
                                                          
 117. See id. at 202, 206–07. 
 118. Id. at 213–14. Likely reasons for the under-reporting include lenient 
failure-to-report penalties in some states, budgetary constraints that limit the 
resources devoted by the state to checking on whether errors were reported, 
and fears on the part of HCPs that their reporting of an error could be used 
against them in malpractice litigation, despite the liability protections typical-
ly present in the states’ laws. Id. at 215–19. 
 119. As noted earlier, federal law generally contemplates a voluntary re-
porting regime. See supra note 115. In the Medicare and Medicaid contexts, 
however, hospitals must report on numerous measures of quality, including 
certain types of medical errors, in order to receive a full updated payment 
from the government in the following fiscal year. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2009 QUALITY MEASURE REPORTING FOR 2010 
PAYMENT UPDATE 1 (2010), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov 
/HospitalQualityInits/Downloads/HospitalRHQDAPU200808.pdf [hereinafter 
QUALITY MEASURE REPORTING]. 
 120. See IOM, TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 4, at 86–87; see also, e.g., Lu-
cian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human: What 
Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384, 2384 (2005). 
 121. CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 23, at 6–8. 
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which seemingly innocuous process failures and mistakes be-
come commonplace, some commentators advise erecting as 
many barriers as possible to errors.122 The reason is not that 
holes in the defensive barriers to error are unavoidable; rather 
the holes are an artifact of institutional rigidity and the organi-
zation’s failure to learn from experience because of the factors 
enumerated in the previous section.123 Such organizations have 
been called “slow learners, slow improvers, slow innovators, 
and ultimately sluggish competitors.”124 Given the complexities 
associated with such causes of error as chaotic team environ-
ments and physician narcissism, defenses based on changing 
human nature are often less effective than mistake-proofing. 
Speaking in regard to an industry other than healthcare but of-
fering a useful suggestion for the medical context, one commen-
tator asserts: 
The old way of dealing with human error was to scold people, retrain 
them, and tell them to be more careful . . . My view is that you can’t 
do much to change human nature, and people are going to make mis-
takes. If you can’t tolerate [error,] you should remove the opportuni-
ties for error.125 
In healthcare, this means changing the design of care delivery. 
The IOM has stated that “[h]ealth care has safety and quality 
problems because it relies on outmoded systems of work. Poor 
designs set the workforce up to fail, regardless of how hard they 
try. If we want safer, higher-quality care, we will need to have 
redesigned systems of care.”126 Both the United States and 
                                                          
 122. See, e.g., STEVEN J. SPEAR, CHASING THE RABBIT 49 (2009). 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. George Labar, Can Ergonomics Cure ‘Human Error’?, OCCUPATIONAL 
HAZARDS, Apr. 1996, at 48. It is common to blame employees individually for 
error and assume that experienced employees need additional training be-
cause they have forgotten what should be done. Human Factors Process for 
Reducing Maintenance Errors, AERO MAG., http://www.boeing.com/commercial 
/aeromagazine/aero_03/textonly/m01txt.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2012). Boe-
ing has termed this phenomenon the “blame and training” cycle, in which 
workers learn nothing new and errors are therefore likely to recur. Id. Other 
commentators have termed this the “blame, shame, and train” cycle which 
helps cause well-intentioned professionals who are placed in poorly designed 
systems to commit the same errors redundantly. See, e.g., Hans Kim, Root 
Cause and Failure Mode/Effects Analysis, Presentation at Harvard Medical 
School Seminar: Progress in Patient Safety (Nov. 2008) (on file with authors); 
Leape Harvard Seminar Nov. 2008, supra note 19. 
 126. INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM 4 (2001). Recommend-
ing changing the design of health care systems to improve patient safety, a 
commentator notes: 
Being careful helps, but it brings us nowhere near perfection . . . . The 
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United Kingdom governments have called for improving the 
safety of healthcare through changing the physical design of 
hospitals and other similar healthcare facilities.127 
Redesigning care systems promises to be no small task, 
however, especially considering that design changes in physical 
environments are relatively infrequent. Consequently, a 
framework is necessary to guide systems redesign. The solution 
needs to employ diverse tools that help ensure healthcare 
workers know what to do differently and that provide a vocabu-
lary of error-avoidance responses.128 Mistake-proofing furnishes 
a systems design framework that meets these criteria. Often 
referred to as “error-proofing,”129 “poka-yoke,”130 and “fail-
safing,”131 mistake-proofing consists of concepts that help for-
mulate design changes to reduce human error and that involve 
the use of process and design features. There is evidence that 
healthcare organizations are beginning to discover the benefits 
of lean-manufacturing techniques, such as those used by Toyo-
ta as part of its mistake-proofing efforts.132 
A. A TYPOLOGY OF APPROACHES 
As a starting point for understanding the potential for mis-
                                                          
remedy is in changing systems of work. The remedy is in de-
sign . . . . The goal should be extreme safety. I believe we should be as 
safe in our hospitals as we are in our homes. But we cannot reach 
that goal through exhortation, censure, outrage, and shame. We can 
reach it only by commitment to change, so that normal, human errors 
can be made irrelevant to outcome, continually found, and skillfully 
mitigated. 
Donald Berwick, Not Again! Preventing Errors Lies in Redesign—Not Exhorta-
tion, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 247, 247–48 (2001). 
 127. J. B. Battles, Quality and Safety by Design, 15 QUALITY & SAFETY IN 
HEALTH CARE (Supp. 1) i1, i1-3 (2006); see also DESIGN COUNCIL, DEP’T OF 
HEALTH, DESIGN FOR PATIENT SAFETY (2003),  
http://www.designcouncil.org.uk/Documents/Documents/Publications/Health/D
esign%20for%20Patient%20Safety_Design_Council.pdf. 
 128. See Grout & Toussaint, supra note 16, at 150. 
 129. MARK GRABAN, LEAN HOSPITALS: IMPROVING QUALITY, PATIENT 
SAFETY, AND EMPLOYEE SATISFACTION 139 (2009). 
 130. SHIGEO SHINGO, ZERO QUALITY CONTROL: SOURCE INSPECTION AND 
THE POKA-YOKE SYSTEM 45 (1986); Grout & Toussaint, supra note 16, at 151. 
 131. Richard B. Chase & Douglas M. Stewart, Make Your Service Fail-Safe, 
35 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 35, 35–43 (1994). 
 132. See Grout & Toussaint, supra note 16, at 150; see also Mark Graban, 
Open Source “Lean Healthcare” Google Map, LEAN BLOG (Aug. 12, 2009), 
http://www.leanblog.org/2009/08/open-source-lean-healthcare-google-map/. 
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take-proofing to improve healthcare quality, we now briefly ex-
amine the various approaches that represent a general frame-
work for its application. Professor Tsuda has developed a typol-
ogy of approaches that, although not exhaustive, provides a 
vocabulary for discussing mistake-proofing design. The ap-
proaches are: “(1) mistake prevention in the work environment; 
(2) mistake detection; (3) mistake prevention” focused on de-
tecting mistake sources; and (4) curtailment of the influence of 
mistakes.133 
Mistake prevention in the work environment involves mak-
ing design changes that stop activities if an error is in pro-
cess.134 Such prevention reduces complexity, ambiguity, vague-
ness, and uncertainty.135 Two basic design principles guide 
mistake prevention in the work environment. The first is mod-
eration of “wide and deep” task structures, with “wide” mean-
ing multiple alternatives for a given decision and “deep” mean-
ing a protracted series of choices.136 Humans normally perform 
either moderately wide and deep tasks reasonably well, but the 
likelihood of mistakes increases if tasks are both wide and 
deep.137 Similarly, visual systems, also known as 5S (organiza-
tion, orderliness, cleanliness, standardization, and discipline), 
involve visually sharing information in work environments in 
order to allow participants to know something important at a 
glance.138 
“Mistake detection identifies process errors found by in-
specting the process after actions have been taken.”139 Alt-
                                                          
 133. Yoshikazu Tsuda, Implications of Fool Proofing in the Manufacturing 
Process, in 16 QUALITY THROUGH ENGINEERING DESIGN 79, 80 (Way Kuo & 
Marcia Martens Pierson eds., 1993). 
 134. SHINGO, supra note 130, at 99. 
 135. GROUT, supra note 17, at 5. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 6. 
 138. See GWENDOLYN D. GALSWORTH, VISUAL SYSTEMS: HARNESSING THE 
POWER OF A VISUAL WORKPLACE 4 (1997). The visual systems principle in-
cludes removing unneeded items from the workplace, arranging needed items 
so that they are easy to find, reducing visual “noise,” institutionalizing im-
provements once made, and avoiding a return to past practices. Id. Consider 
some examples of visual systems. Glidden EZ Tracks ceiling paint is pink 
when wet but dries white. Glidden EZ Track Ceiling Paint, GLIDDEN, 
http://www.glidden.com/pro/products/ez-track-ceiling-paint-pro.do (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2012). Since painting a ceiling almost always involves painting over 
old white paint, the pink color makes obtaining uniform coverage easier and 
prevents mistakes. Id. 
 139. GROUT, supra note 17, at 7. 
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hough obviously not as effective as mistake prevention, 
knowledge that a mistake has been made will often permit re-
medial actions to be taken soon enough to avoid some of the 
most undesirable results of the mistake.140 Data acquired from 
inspections can also be used to reduce the occurrence of incor-
rect actions using a technique known as statistical process con-
trol, which indicates when processes are out of control.141 Other 
mistake-detection techniques include successive checks, inspec-
tions of previous steps when a mistake is found at a subsequent 
step, and self-checks that allow process participants to assess 
the quality of their own work.142 
Mistake prevention of the source-detection variety identi-
fies problems found through process inspections before harm-
causing errors can occur.143 Once a human has initiated a pro-
cess, the process may perform an inspection itself.144 Design 
changes that reduce or eliminate the consequences of the errors 
are introduced.145 Airbags and guardrails are examples of pre-
venting the influence of mistakes.146 These design features do 
not stop automobile accidents from happening but are usually 
preferable to the alternative that may result in their ab-
sence.147 
A useful example of a mistake-prevention safety feature is 
a device that reduces injuries from table saws. The Consumer 
Product Safety Commission estimated that in 2001, there were 
55,300 medically treated blade-contact injuries associated with 
                                                          
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. Consider the example of Applied Bolting Technology’s direct-
tension-indicating washers. See Direct Tension Indicator, APPLIED BOLTING 
TECH., http://www.appliedbolting.com/direct-tension-indicator-bolting-
method.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2012). These washers are used to detect 
when bolts have been torqued to the correct tension. Id. Each washer has 
small indentations that are filled with orange polymer. Id. As the bolt is tight-
ened, the indentations are flattened, squeezing the polymer to the edge of the 
washer. Id. Properly tightened washers have a distinctive pattern of orange 
polymer around them. Id. Visual inspection of the tightness can easily be ac-
complished. Id. More importantly, since the tightness criterion is apparent, 
workers continue to tighten the bolt until proper tightness is achieved. Id. 
This makes defects and rework very unlikely. 
 143. GROUT, supra note 17, at 9. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 13. 
 147. See id. 
LANGVARDT_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2013  11:38 AM 
2013] MISTAKE-PROOFING MEDICINE 415 
table saw use.148 Fifteen percent of these instances resulted in 
amputations and related costs of approximately $2.13 billion.149 
An important mistake-proofing device is featured on SawStop™ 
table saws, which employ an electrically charged blade moni-
tored by a signal processing unit in order to detect human flesh 
coming in contact with the table saw blade.150 The voltage 
drops when flesh contacts the blade, causing an aluminum 
brake to be deployed.151 This stops the blade within five milli-
seconds.152 The safety device mounted on a table saw that is of 
high quality in other respects has allowed the SawStop™ saw 
to become the market’s best-selling cabinet saw despite a sev-
eral hundred dollar price premium.153 
SawStop™ also illustrates the use of purposeful design to 
prevent the influence of mistakes because it dramatically re-
duces the severity of any resulting injury. Preventing the influ-
ence of mistakes involves either facilitation of mistake correc-
tion or decoupling of processes.154 Facilitating correction is 
accomplished through planned responses when mistakes occur 
in a manner analogous to auto-correct functions used in com-
puters.155 Decoupling involves separating error-prone activities 
at points where errors become irreversible.156 An example is the 
deletion of email messages that can be later retrieved if need-
ed.157 
Both mistake prevention and mistake detection require 
what are known as setting and control functions.158 Setting 
functions differentiate between safe and unsafe conditions; 
therefore, they are the mechanisms for determining that an er-
                                                          
 148. Memorandum from Page C. Faulk, Gen. Counsel, Jeffrey R. Williams, 
Assistant Gen. Counsel for Enforcement and Info., and Hyun S. Kim, Attorney 
Office of the Gen. Counsel, to Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n (June 28, 2006), 
available at http://www.cpsc.gov/library/foia/foia06/brief/tablesaw.pdf. 
 149. Id. 
 150. SawStop Table Saws are the Most Advanced Saws in the World, Set-
ting the Standard for Table Saw Safety, SAWSTOP, http://www.sawstop.com/ 
howitworks/sawstop_whitepaper.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. SawStop, SAWSTOP, http://www.sawstop.com (last visited Oct. 18, 
2012). 
 154. GROUT, supra note 17, at 9. 
 155. Id. at 10. 
 156. Id. at 13. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 7, 9. 
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ror has occurred or is about to occur.159 The more precise the 
setting functions, the more extensive mistake-proofing can 
be.160 Once a setting function determines that an error has oc-
curred or is imminent, a control function signals the error.161 
In 1999, Donald Berwick, then the president of the Insti-
tute for Healthcare Improvement, delivered an address in 
which he discussed a need for new tools to improve healthcare 
quality. Making a statement that remains true today, he noted 
that “[o]ur current tools can’t do the job. We can’t get where we 
need to go by stressing the current system.”162 Berwick then of-
fered an instructive example from a setting other than 
healthcare. Restrooms in his workplace had signs that slide in 
order to indicate whether the restroom was occupied or, in-
stead, vacant.163 These signs were to be moved by the user upon 
entering and leaving the facility. Berwick found the sign in the 
correct position 61% of the time, with the most prevalent error 
being the sign indicating “occupied” when the restroom was ac-
tually vacant.164 The result was that ignoring the sign could 
lead to better outcomes than acting based on what the sign ac-
tually indicated.165 In an effort to solve this problem, he placed 
on the door a handwritten sign that stated “Please flip the 
sign.”166 After that sign was ignored, he placed on the door an 
additional sign stating “Please read the sign (below) about flip-
                                                          
 159. Id. at 7. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 9. Setting functions are of four types: (1) physical—checks to en-
sure that physical attributes of a process are correct; (2) sequencing—checks 
the precedence relationship of the process to ensure steps are in the correct 
order; (3) grouping or counting—checks to ensure that matched sets of re-
sources are available or that the correct number of repetitions has occurred; 
and (4) information enhancement—assures that information required in the 
process is available at the correct time and place and is salient to the user in 
noisy environments. Id. Control and regulatory functions are also of four 
types: (1) forced—physical size and shape or electronic controls detect and in-
terdict the mistakes before it can occur, (2) shutdown—the entire process is 
automatically stopped; (3) warning—a mistake is signaled but the process is 
allowed to continue unless stopped by an operator; and (4) sensory alert—
some sensory cue signals ex post that a mistake has occurred or been acted 
upon. Id. at 10. 
 162. DONALD M. BERWICK, ESCAPE FIRE: DESIGNS FOR THE FUTURE OF 
HEALTH CARE 34–35 (2002). 
 163. Id. at 35. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 36. 
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ping the sign.”167 That effort, too, failed. Signs that relied upon 
humans to remember to change their signal simply did not 
work.168 The replacement tool Berwick contrasted was an au-
tomatic vacant/occupied sign of the sort used in aircraft lavato-
ries to provide an extremely accurate indication of restroom 
status.169 This tool was an example of a forcing function, bor-
rowed from mistake-proofing, to create a situation in which the 
actions are constrained so that failure at one stage prevents the 
next step from happening.170 
Another commentator expresses this problem more global-
ly: “It is not sufficient to address excessive medical errors by 
just adding more staff and more costs. Rather, it is important 
to get at the root causes of errors and to design systems that 
make the errors impossible to occur.”171 In the following subsec-
tion, we consider ways in which particular mistake-proofing 
techniques can address causes of errors and thereby enhance 
healthcare quality. 
B. APPLICATIONS OF MISTAKE-PROOFING IN HEALTHCARE 
SETTINGS 
Mistake-proofing is typically inexpensive172 in comparison 
with the extraordinary human and financial cost associated 
with medical errors.173 It can therefore result in substantial re-
turns on investment when applied to healthcare.174 Opportuni-
ties for mistake-proofing abound in healthcare, and, despite 
some progress, many of these opportunities go unrealized. En-
hanced understanding of why errors persist should lead to the 
identification of mistake-proofing techniques capable of pre-
venting or correcting the errors.175 Nonetheless, one can obtain 
                                                          
 167. Id. 
 168. Cf. id. at 37. 
 169. Id. at 37. 
 170. Id. at 37; see also GROUT, supra note 17, at 8–9. 
 171. ROBERT CHALICE, STOP RISING HEALTHCARE COSTS USING THE 
TOYOTA LEAN PRODUCTION METHODS 25 (2d ed. 2005). 
 172. GROUT, supra note 17, at 14. 
 173. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, MEDICAL ERRORS: 
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 1 (2003) (explaining that medical errors cost the 
country $37.6 billion per year). 
 174. See GROUT, supra note 17, at 15–16. 
 175. See Kelly M. Pyrek, Can Medicine Be Made Mistake-Proof?, 
INFECTION CONTROL TODAY (Apr. 1, 2008), 
http://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/articles/can-medicine-be-made.html. 
Later discussion will provide examples. See infra text accompanying notes 
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a sense of mistake-proofing’s potential by examining some suc-
cess stories using Tsuda’s typology in simplified healthcare set-
tings before turning to more complex systems.176 
Typically, several bags of intravenous fluids are hung from 
IV poles in intensive care units. Tubes run out of the IV bags 
and into infusion pumps that carefully measure the amount de-
livered to the patient’s bloodstream. Hooks holding the bags are 
arrayed in four directions, in the manner of a compass. Many 
infusion pumps are thus designed to handle up to four fluids 
concurrently. Embo-Optics provides an improved IV pole that 
allows the bags to be hung side-by-side and physically lined up 
above the section of the infusion pump that is controlling the 
relevant fluid.177 The pole is equipped with colored lights to il-
luminate each bag in semi-dark rooms.178 Color coding at the 
other end of the IV tubes matches the colored lighting of the IV 
fluids. Besides making the monitoring of the IVs easier, these 
changes prevent mistakes and thus furnish an example of mis-
take prevention in the work environment.179 
Hand hygiene is a critical factor in reducing the large 
numbers of nosocomial infections.180 One hundred percent com-
pliance with hand hygiene is very difficult to achieve.181 In an 
                                                          
179–202. For discussion of a more extensive set of examples, see GROUT, supra 
note 17, at 117–46. 
 176. See Tsuda, supra note 133, at 80. 
 177. See Vitaid Anesthetic Products, IPV MED., 
http://www.ipvmedical.com/vitaid.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See IV Illuminators, MERCURY MED., http://mercurymed.com/catalogs/ 
RDR_IVIlluminators.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2012); Vitaid Anesthetic Prod-
ucts, supra note 177. In another example of mistake prevention in the work 
environment (an example analogous to achieving more uniform coverage of 
ceiling with pink paint that dries white), adding dye that changes the antisep-
tic Chlorhexidine from clear to blue-green made it far more popular with doc-
tors who could see where they had missed. Surgical Products, SURGICAL 
PRODS. MAG. (June 1, 2008), http://www.surgicalproductsmag.com/ 
scripts/default.asp (follow “Digital Edition” hyperlink; then follow “2008” un-
der “Back Issues” hyperlink; then follow “June 2008” hyperlink) (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2012). 
 180. Hand Hygiene Recording and Reminding System, HYGREEN, 
http://hygreen.com/index.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2012) [hereinafter 
HYGREEN]. Infections acquired in hospitals take the lives of 270 patients per 
day. Id. 
 181. The narcissism discussed earlier in the article, see supra Part III.C, 
can play a role in something as simple as hand hygiene. See Mark Todd, Doc-
tors Don’t Have Germs, Nurse Told, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (June 21, 
2005), http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/doctors-dont-have-germs-nurse-
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example of mistake detection, Hygreen, Inc. has developed a 
high technology monitoring system to detect mistakes in hand 
hygiene.182 The system utilizes a device that senses hand-
washing by individual healthcare workers, who are identified 
by an electronic badge they wear.183 The date, time, and loca-
tion of the hand-washing are recorded in a centralized database 
and a green light on the badge is illuminated.184 When a worker 
approaches a patient’s bed, a sensor near the bed verifies that 
hand-washing has occurred or causes the badge to vibrate if 
hand-washing has not occurred.185 The green light turns off af-
ter coming in proximity with the bed’s sensor.186 
More than 100,000 wheelchair-related injuries are treated 
annually,187 with 167 deaths being recorded during the period 
from 1997 through 1999.188 Many of these injuries occur when 
patients are entering or leaving the wheelchair.189 If the pa-
tient forgets to engage the brake while transferring, the wheel-
chair can roll, toppling the patient. In an example of mistake 
prevention through source inspection, there has been develop-
ment of a mistake-proofing device that avoids this problem by 
automatically locking the wheels whenever weight is not ap-
plied to the seat of the chair.190 A hand release allows an at-
tendant to move unoccupied wheelchairs.191 
In the past, blood pressure cuffs and thermometers con-
tained potentially toxic mercury, which could be released if ei-
ther item were damaged or not disposed of properly.192 In an 
example of preventing the influence of mistakes, non-toxic ma-
                                                          
told/2005/06/20/1119250928025.html. 
 182. See HYGREEN, supra note 180. 
 183. HyGreen and Hand Hygiene: How it Works, HYGREEN, 
http://hygreen.com/HandHygieneMonitor/How.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2012). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. H. Xiang et al., Wheelchair-Related Injuries Treated in U.S. Emergen-
cy Departments, 12 INJ. PREVENTION 8, 8 (2006). 
 188. John Grout, Examples 41–50, MISTAKEPROOFING.COM, 
http://www.mistakeproofing.com/example5.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2012). 
 189. See Julie A. Braun, Legal and Medical Aspects of Long-Term Care Lit-
igation, in 1 THE ELDER LAW PORTFOLIO SERIES 13-1, 13-183 to -184 (Harry S. 
Margolis ed., 2007). 
 190. GROUT, supra note 17, at 56. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See Recommended Management and Disposal Options for Mercury-
Containing Products, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
hg/mgmt_options.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2012). 
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terials are now substituted for the mercury.193 
C. MISTAKE-PROOFING AND COMPLEX HEALTHCARE PROCESSES 
The foregoing examples of mistake-proofing involve simple 
solutions to rather simple, low-level problems. Mistake-proofing 
in healthcare is not limited to problems of this nature, however. 
It can also be applied to more complex processes. Problem di-
agnosis in more complex settings, however, often requires root 
cause and failure/mode effects analysis (RCA). RCA adheres to 
the mistake-proofing tenets that systems can be made safer by 
design and that analysis of adverse events can guide this de-
sign.194 
In more complex systems settings, there are almost always 
multiple factors contributing to mistakes. No one of these fac-
tors alone is the root cause. Errors are a function of natural 
weaknesses in human cognition and behavior (human factors) 
interacting with systems errors (latent errors), with the result 
that any well-intentioned professional who is placed in a poorly 
designed system is likely to commit an error. Hence, in these 
settings RCA might be better termed “contributing factors 
analysis.” Contributing factors include such influences as man-
agement decisions, organizational processes, work conditions, 
workload, supervision, knowledge, ability, and barriers.195 RCA 
counters the tendency to focus on what appear to be the obvious 
causes proximate to an adverse event and looks beyond to the 
underlying causes. Information is gathered from a variety of 
sources regarding broader, systemic factors. Structured inquiry 
examines not only the active failure but work conditions, man-
agement decisions, and organizational processes, using such 
techniques as cause-and-effect (“fishbone”) diagrams, process 
flow charting, and multidisciplinary meetings.196 
Consider, for example, the process of prescribing medicine 
for patients. This deceptively simple process too often results in 
prescription errors, which are costly occurrences.197 One hospi-
                                                          
 193. See id. 
 194. Kim, supra note 125; see GROUT, supra note 17, at 26–35. 
 195. Kim, supra note 125; see GROUT, supra note 17, at 26–35. 
 196. Kim, supra note 125; see GROUT, supra note 17, at 26–35. 
 197. See Lauran Neergaard, Medication Errors Injure More Than 1.5m, 
BOSTON.COM, (July 21, 2006), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/ 
2006/07/21/medication_errors_injure_more_than_15m/ (“[A] serious drug error 
can add more than $5,800 to the hospital bill of a single patient. Assuming 
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tal reported that medication errors frequently stemmed from 
the combination of pharmacists being unable to read prescrip-
tions written by physicians, the need for immediate admin-
istration of medication when waiting presented risks, and the 
unavailability of physicians to clarify the prescriptions due to 
other commitments.198 An RCA of a medication error in a hos-
pital revealed that the following factors contributed to the er-
ror’s occurrence: (1) containers containing the correct and in-
correct medications looked similar; (2) the error occurred on a 
Friday (patients prefer to be treated on Fridays and hospital 
management liked to accommodate patients, leading to high 
volume and the consequence that the pharmacist was hurried); 
(3) staffing was inadequate on Fridays because there was not 
enough room in the pharmacy to accommodate more pharma-
cists; and (4) the lack of room resulted from a building design 
that could only accommodate two sterile hoods, one of which 
was reserved for biological agents.199 
Computer-assisted prescribing furnishes a partial answer 
to the problem of medication error. Such prescribing has been 
estimated to result in a fifty percent or greater reduction in er-
rors.200 The imposition of information technology on flawed pro-
cesses, however, has been analogized to paving over cart 
paths.201 A more efficacious approach involves using failure 
modes and effects analysis to prospectively identify high-risk 
processes and create detailed process mapping. Next comes an 
identification of all the ways in which errors may occur, as well 
as consideration of the effects of the errors, followed by priori-
tizing the process steps based on the probability of occurrence 
and consequences of failure. Mistake-proofing the process 
would then be the final step.202 In the medication-error exam-
                                                          
that hospitals commit 400,000 preventable drug errors each year, that’s $3.5 
billion—not counting lost productivity and other costs—from hospitals 
alone . . . .”). 
 198. Interview with C. Lynne Rover-Willoughby, Dir. of Med. Informatics, 
Cmty. Health Network, in Indianapolis, Ind. (Oct. 19, 2004). 
 199. Kim, supra note 125. 
 200. CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 23, at 6. 
 201. Interview with Ronald W. Dollens, former President and Chief Exec. 
Officer, Guidant Corp., in Bloomington, Ind. (Feb. 1, 2006); see Naresh Khatri 
et al., Medical Errors and Quality of Care, 48 CAL. MGMT. REV. 115, 134–35 
(2006). 
 202. Kim, supra note 125. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare executives 
report that implementation of its Electronic Medical Record (EMR) system led 
its hospitals to engage in a streamlining of healthcare processes, with sub-
stantial savings in time and money resulting from process improvements con-
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ple, mistake-proofing might involve the following actions: drug 
containers could be designed so that medicines that are similar 
in appearance are segregated in markedly different containers; 
computerized physician-order entry systems could be employed 
to remove the issue of illegibility and automatically signal drug 
interactions; and scheduling could be managed to better bal-
ance prescription volume. 
Given the previously discussed roles of complex processes, 
chaotic team environments, and behavioral dysfunctions in 
causing medical errors, one might expect HCPs to wholeheart-
edly embrace mistake-proofing because of its low cost and reli-
ance upon fail-safe techniques.203 Despite mistake-proofing’s 
potential to enhance healthcare quality in a relatively inexpen-
sive fashion204 and despite the identification of many specific 
mistake-proofing processes of a beneficial nature,205 mistake-
proofing adoption has not occurred on as widespread basis as it 
should have. In the following section, we consider a likely rea-
son for that state of affairs. 
V. IMPEDIMENTS TO WIDESPREAD ADOPTION OF 
MISTAKE-PROOFING IN HEALTHCARE FIELD 
Because negligence liability is premised on harm-causing 
mistakes that fall below the standard of due care, mistake-
proofing efforts of the sort discussed in this article make a 
great deal of sense in the healthcare environment. They are de-
signed to lessen the likelihood of harm-causing medical errors, 
and they relate directly to the individual-error, group-error, 
and system-error aspects of the negligence liability environ-
ment faced by HCPs. Moreover, they typically do not carry a 
hefty price tag and are relatively easy to implement.206 So why 
                                                          
sidered to be a necessary prerequisite to fully successful EMR implementation. 
Interviews with Mark R. Neaman, CEO, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, 
past Chairman, Healthcare Leadership Council, and past Chairman, Nat’l 
Comm. for Quality Healthcare, Jeffrey H. Hillebrand Chief Operating Officer, 
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, Thomas H. Hodges Chief Fin. Officer, 
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, Joseph Golbus President, ENH Med. 
Grp., Peggy King Senior Vice President, Quality and Risk Mgmt., Evanston 
Northwestern Healthcare, and Dr. Ned Wagner Med. Dir. of Med. Informatics, 
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, in Evanston, IL (Apr. 19, 2006). 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 62–109. 
 204. See GROUT, supra note 17, at 14. 
 205. See id. at 117–46. 
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 172–173. 
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would HCPs resist implementation of mistake-proofing pro-
cesses? A key reason appears to be the same one encountered in 
regard to mistake-proofing efforts in the manufacturing con-
text: concern that adoption of a mistake-proofing process after 
harm has come to a patient (or a product user, in the product 
liability setting) could be used against the defendant in the 
harmed party’s attempt to have negligence liability imposed on 
the defendant.207 In other words, HCPs are concerned about 
falling victim to this argument: “Your adoption of the mistake-
proofing process after I was harmed suggests that you should 
have implemented it sooner in order to protect me—and others 
like me—against being harmed. Therefore, your failure to 
adopt the mistake-proofing process earlier indicates negligence 
on your part.” But is this concern on the part of HCPs well-
founded? We turn to that question in the following discussion. 
A. THE SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES RULES: CONTENT 
AND RATIONALE 
In order to determine whether the above-described concern 
of HCPs is soundly based, we must address Federal Rule of Ev-
idence (FRE) 407.208 This evidentiary rule is usually referred to 
as the “subsequent remedial measures” rule because it is so ti-
tled.209 Although the negligence principles that govern mal-
practice cases exist as part of state law, such cases may be pur-
sued in federal court if the requirements of diversity 
jurisdiction are met. 210 For diversity jurisdiction to exist, the 
plaintiff and the defendant(s) must be from different states and 
the amount in controversy—the damages sought by the plain-
tiff—must exceed $75,000.211 Because some malpractice cases 
may be litigated in federal court under the right set of condi-
tions, FRE 407 is of considerable potential relevance to the is-
sues addressed in this article. Although FRE 407 does not ap-
ply when malpractice cases are brought in state courts, as 
                                                          
 207. The concern is that “[i]n claiming the ‘after,’ one must own up to the 
‘before.’” GROUT, supra note 17, at 17. Cf. National Survey, supra note 5, at 
218–19 (noting similar fear that may cause some HCPs not to fulfill their obli-
gation to report medical errors even if the relevant state’s law requires such a 
report). 
 208. FED. R. EVID. 407 (2006). 
 209. Id.; see also, e.g., C. Paul Carver, Subsequent Remedial Measures 2000 
and Beyond, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 583, 584 (2001). 
 210. E.g., Leazer v. Kiefer, 821 P.2d 957, 960 (Idaho 1991); Darling v. 
Charleston Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 256–57 (Ill. 1965). 
 211. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
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many of them are,212 state rules that match or closely resemble 
FRE 407 normally will apply.213 
FRE 407 reads as follows: 
When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or 
harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove: 
• negligence; 
• culpable conduct; 
• a defect in a product or its design; or 
• a need for a warning or instruction. 
But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as 
impeachment or—if disputed—proving ownership, control, or the fea-
sibility of precautionary measures.214 
An evidentiary rule of similar content and effect exists in 
most states.215 In the following discussion, we will often refer to 
FRE 407 and its state law counterparts as the “subsequent re-
medial measures rules.” 
The subsequent remedial measures rules rest on the policy 
determination that steps to improve safety and minimize future 
                                                          
 212. See SHOWALTER, supra note 34, at 39–77; WING, supra note 32, at 
287–92. 
 213. See Carver, supra note 209, at 584, 587–89; Chris Guthrie, Misjudg-
ing, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 422 (2007); Roger C. Henderson, Product Liability and 
Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures: Resolving the Conflict By 
Recognizing the Difference Between Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 64 
NEB. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985). 
 214. FED. R. EVID. 407. This version of the rule took effect in December 
2011. Id. The version in effect from 1997 to December 2011 read as follows: 
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, 
measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the 
injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent 
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a 
defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a 
warning or instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of ev-
idence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, 
such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary 
measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 
Id. (superseded by revised version effective Dec. 1, 2011). The 2011 version 
was “part of the general restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more 
easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout 
the rules.” Id. (Committee Notes on Rules—2011 Amendment). Because the 
changes effected by the 2011 version were meant to be “stylistic only,” there 
was “no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” 
Id. 
 215. See Carver, supra note 209, at 584, 587–89; Guthrie, supra note 213, 
at 422; Henderson, supra note 213, at 4. Details of the respective state rules 
are beyond the scope of this article. 
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harm are in the obvious interest of the public, and that their 
implementation should therefore be encouraged. If, however, 
evidence of a defendant’s post-harm-to-the-plaintiff adoption of 
a safety measure could be used by the plaintiff to help make his 
case against the defendant, there would be a disincentive to 
adopt such measures.216 Under a regime of that nature, the de-
fendant’s short-term interest in avoiding liability in a particu-
lar case could take priority in the defendant’s decision-making, 
perhaps causing the defendant not to adopt what might other-
wise be a perfectly sensible safety measure. Such a decision 
would undermine the long-term interests in furthering safety 
and minimizing future defects or errors.217 
To serve the broader public interests at stake, then, evi-
dentiary rules on subsequent remedial measures become neces-
sary. With the defendant having the subsequent remedial 
measures rules’ assurance that post-harm adoption of the safe-
ty measure will not disadvantage him, her, or it in the litiga-
tion at hand, the defendant should be more likely to do the 
right thing and adopt the safety measure.218 Besides being in 
the public interest, the measure should operate in the long-
term interest of the defendant. If the measure lessens the like-
lihood of future instances of harm, it should correspondingly 
reduce the amount of litigation with which the defendant might 
otherwise have to contend.219 
Of course, the subsequent remedial measures rules are 
likely to help achieve their policy objective of encouraging the 
adoption of safety measures only if defendants and would-be 
defendants are sufficiently aware of the existence of such evi-
dentiary rules. Such awareness on the part of manufacturers 
probably has helped to pave the way toward broader adoption 
of mistake-proofing processes in the manufacturing realm.220 
Among HCPs, however, insufficient awareness that the subse-
quent remedial measures rules may be applied to their activi-
                                                          
 216. See Guthrie, supra note 213, at 423; Henderson, supra note 213, at 5–
6; Joseph A. Hoffman & George D. Zuckerman, Tort Reform and Rules of Evi-
dence: Saving the Rule Excluding Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Action, 22 
TORT & INS. L.J. 497, 498 (1987). 
 217. Carver, supra note 209, at 610; Guthrie, supra note 213, at 423; Hen-
derson, supra note 213, at 5–6; Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 216, at 508. 
 218. See Carver, supra note 209, at 610; Guthrie, supra note 213, at 423; 
Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 216, at 508. 
 219. See Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 216, at 508–09. 
 220. See Carver, supra note 209, at 610–11; Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra 
note 216, at 508–09. 
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ties could help explain why the adoption of mistake-proofing 
techniques has not been more widespread in the healthcare 
field.221 
B. THE SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES RULES: 
HEALTHCARE APPLICATIONS 
It is important to note that even though the subsequent 
remedial measures rules may be applied most often in the con-
text of product liability litigation, their application is not—and 
should not be—restricted to that context.222 FRE 407 does say, 
of course, that evidence of a subsequent remedial measure can-
not be used to prove the existence of “a defect in a product or its 
design; or a need for a warning or instruction.”223 Although the 
quoted language directly contemplates product liability cases, 
earlier language in FRE 407 indicates that the rule can be ap-
plied outside the product liability context. The rule states that 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures cannot be used to 
prove “negligence [or] culpable conduct” on the part of the de-
fendant.224 This portion of the rule speaks in terms of failures 
to use reasonable care more generally, without any language 
limiting the “negligence [or] culpable conduct” reference to the 
product liability setting.225 Subsequent remedial measures 
rules among the states are to the same general effect.226 Be-
                                                          
 221. See GROUT, supra note 17, at 17–18. 
 222. See Henderson, supra note 213, at 1–6; see also FED. R. EVID. 407 
(Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules) (noting that “courts have 
applied this principle to exclude evidence of subsequent repairs, installation of 
safety devices, changes in company rules, and discharge of employees”). Some 
states’ formulations of the subsequent remedial measures rules do not contain 
language specifically mentioning product defects and subsequent corrective 
measures—a further indication that the rules are not meant to be restricted to 
the context of product liability litigation. See Carver, supra note 209, at 587–
89. Although the subsequent remedial measures rules normally are interpret-
ed as having potential applicability to product liability cases regardless of 
whether the specific formulations expressly mention product safety, there has 
been some division among the states as to whether the rules apply in all prod-
uct liability cases (whether negligence-based or brought on a strict liability 
theory), or only in those product liability cases that are negligence-based. See 
id. at 587–91; Henderson, supra note 213, at 3–20. Further exploration of the 
latter set of issues is beyond the scope of this article. 
 223. FED. R. EVID. 407. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See Guthrie, supra note 213, at 422–23; Henderson, supra note 213, at 
1–6. 
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cause malpractice cases against HCPs are based on principles 
of “negligence” and require proof of “culpable conduct” in the 
form of a failure to use reasonable care, the subsequent reme-
dial measures rules are applicable in the healthcare realm.227 
Accordingly, if an HCP being sued by a harmed plaintiff is 
considering adoption of a mistake-proofing process meant to 
reduce the likelihood that a future patient would be harmed in 
the way the plaintiff was, the HCP’s decision on whether to 
adopt the mistake-proofing process should be made with 
knowledge of the protection afforded by the subsequent reme-
dial measures rules. Concern of the “they’ll use it against me in 
the lawsuit” variety is not a well-founded reason for rejecting 
implementation of such a safety measure when it otherwise 
seems reasonable and would further a long-term interest that 
the HCP and its future patients share: the interest in lessening 
the likelihood of medical errors. 
It should be noted, of course, that even though the subse-
quent remedial measures rules have the above-noted general 
effect of prohibiting plaintiffs from making evidentiary use of 
later safety measures in an effort to prove the defendant’s neg-
ligence,228 the rules do not furnish a guarantee that evidence of 
such measures can never be used. FRE 407, for instance, per-
mits the use of such evidence when it is offered “for another 
purpose, such as impeachment or—if disputed—proving owner-
ship, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures.”229 
These exceptional instances depend, however, on litigation tac-
tics and/or testimony in which the defendant effectively opens 
the door to use of evidence of the safety measures.230 Absent 
such opening of the door, the defendant’s mere adoption of the 
safety measure is not enough to justify admission of evidence 
thereof.231 
                                                          
 227. See FED. R. EVID. 407; see also id. (Notes of Advisory Committee on 
Proposed Rules) (noting examples of contexts in which rule applies); Hender-
son, supra note 213, at 1–6 (noting application of federal and state rules in 
negligence cases). 
 228. See supra text accompanying notes 214–218, 222–227. 
 229. FED. R. EVID. 407. 
 230. The “if disputed” language in the rule is the key here. See id. 
 231. In any litigation in which issues may arise under the relevant subse-
quent remedial measures rule, the mistake-proofing HCP would be well-
advised to file a motion in limine in an effort to get the evidentiary questions 
sorted out and ruled upon ahead of trial. The same would be true where the 
HCP has adopted mistake-proofing processes concerning some of its 
healthcare services but not regarding the different particular services the 
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VI. MISTAKE-PROOFING AND ERROR REDUCTION: 
WHAT TO DO? 
We turn here to recommendations that flow from the arti-
cle’s earlier sections dealing with the need to reduce the rate 
and number of medical errors, the usefulness in that regard of 
mistake-proofing techniques, and the impediments to more 
widespread adoption of such techniques. Some recommenda-
tions in the following subsections have a specific mistake-
proofing thrust; others speak to error-reduction issues more 
generally. 
A. ENHANCE HCPS’ UNDERSTANDING OF NEGLIGENCE 
PRINCIPLES AND RELATED CONSIDERATIONS 
As earlier discussion revealed, HCPs are not legally liable 
to a patient every time a bad outcome resulted from medical 
treatment they ordered or administered. Rather, HCPs are lia-
ble only if the bad outcome resulted from medical treatment 
that reflected negligence because it fell below the standard of 
reasonable care examined earlier in the article.232 One pre-
sumes—and hopes—that most HCPs are aware of these fun-
damental principles. Yet even if HCPs have this awareness, 
they need a realistic understanding of what the reasonable care 
standard actually contemplates. 
For instance, the reasonable care standard does not require 
the ordering of every conceivable test or procedure that a phy-
sician might order for a given patient who displays certain 
symptoms. If it is quite unlikely that a particular disease or 
condition would be the cause of the symptoms and much more 
likely that another explanation is the genuine one, the hypo-
thetical reasonable physician against whom the actual physi-
cian is measured might decline to order a test that would rule 
out the quite unlikely disease or condition. Thus, the physician 
who does not order that test may well have exercised reasona-
ble care.233 This is especially apt to be the case if the test for 
                                                          
plaintiff was receiving when she experienced harm. Evidence of such adoption 
of mistake-proofing processes by the HCP should not be admissible to prove 
negligence in failing to mistake-proof the particular services received by the 
plaintiff. Allowing such evidence to be admitted would violate at least the spir-
it of the subsequent remedial measures rules. A general lack-of-relevance ob-
jection would also be appropriate. 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 43–52. 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 43–52, 110–113. 
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the improbable condition is also very expensive or physically 
onerous for the patient.234 Of course, other factors—such as ex-
treme severity of the potentially resulting harm to the patient 
if she in fact has the improbable condition—could tip the scales 
the other way on whether a reasonable physician would order 
the test.235 Even so, this basic point remains valid: properly ap-
plied, negligence law’s reasonable care standard does not con-
template a tests-and-procedures arms race in which HCPs who 
fail to keep up are necessarily doomed to liability. 
Physicians and other HCPs frequently invoke the defensive 
medicine argument in response to the foregoing paragraph’s 
observations. If we do not order this vast array of tests and pro-
cedures, the argument goes, we will be sued. Therefore, the ar-
gument continues, we end up ordering tests and procedures 
that we really do not think are necessary (or even very desira-
ble) in order to protect ourselves against the litigation that in 
today’s environment almost certainly will follow if we do not 
take such defensive steps.236 
Those who make the defensive medicine argument do so 
with considerable earnestness, but they may suffer from dis-
torted senses of the respective likelihoods of being sued for 
malpractice and being held liable in such cases. Contrary to the 
argument’s premise that lawsuits and potential liability are a 
given unless the HCP engages in what amounts to over-
treating, the percentage of patients who take legal action over 
medical errors that harmed them has been shown to be as low 
as only three to six percent.237 Moreover, in the small percent-
age of instances when an error does result in litigation, plain-
                                                          
 234. See supra text accompanying notes 43–52. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See supra text accompanying notes 110–113. 
 237. Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malprac-
tice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 399 n.26 (2005). Other estimates 
put the percentage higher, at ten to fourteen percent. Neil Vidmar, Medical 
Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, the Contingency Fee Sys-
tem, Juries, and Social Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1226–27 (2005). Re-
gardless of whether the correct estimate is three to six percent or, instead, ten 
to fourteen percent, it is clear that the vast majority of harmed patients do not 
file claims. Id. at 1227–28; see also Hyman & Silver, supra note 110, at 976; 
David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Med-
ical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2025 (2006). Physi-
cians, however, have been shown to overestimate significantly their actual 
risk of being sued. One study concluded that physicians perceive the risk of 
being sued as three times greater than it actually is. Gunnar, supra note 110, 
at 476. 
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tiffs win their cases only about twenty-five percent of the 
time.238 HCPs naturally do not want to be in the groups sued 
and/or held liable, even if those groups are statistically small. 
However, a more realistic understanding among HCPs of the 
likelihood—really unlikelihood—of being sued, let alone being 
held liable, should work to the benefit of HCPs and the 
healthcare system by lessening HCPs’ tendencies to think ex-
treme defensive medicine is necessary and by reducing the con-
siderable costs that accompany unwarranted tests and proce-
dures. 
By ordering tests and procedures they, in the exercise of 
their professional judgment, would not order if not for their in-
accurate sense of the risk of litigation and liability, physicians 
are not necessarily increasing the quality of care and are doing 
little or nothing to reduce medical error frequency.239 Moreover, 
what they see as an objectionable but necessary litigation risk-
mitigation strategy may be a counterproductive self-fulfilling 
prophecy. If large numbers of physicians operate under the 
misimpression that they have to order tests and procedures 
they would not otherwise order, then doing so indeed becomes 
the norm despite its lack of soundness. It also creates the po-
tential for an unwarranted ratcheting-up of the reasonable care 
standard, as a plaintiff’s attorney can argue that with every-
body else ordering this huge battery of tests and procedures, a 
particular defendant’s failure to do so must have been wrong.240 
To the extent that judges and juries buy this view of what 
should constitute reasonable care, HCPs will continue to feel 
hamstrung in their attempts to exercise their professional 
judgment. It is a hamstringing brought on in large part, how-
ever, by HCPs’ failure to have a realistic sense of their chances 
of being sued and of being held liable. 
Acquiring the realistic understanding that the chances of 
being sued and of being held liable are small should give HCPs 
greater confidence that they do not reflexively have to join the 
unwarranted tests-and-procedures arms race. In the process, 
                                                          
 238. Sharkey, supra note 237, at 451–52; Vidmar, supra note 237, at 1232. 
 239. They may even be increasing the risk of errors, as each additional pro-
cedure presents a risk of error. Sanjay Gupta, More Treatment, More Mistakes, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2012, at A21. 
 240. As earlier discussion suggested, one consideration in the reasonable 
care standard is what other HCPs are or are not doing. See supra text accom-
panying notes 43–52. 
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they can free themselves to do what they entered the profession 
to do: exercise their best judgment in an effort to promote the 
health of their patients. Rather than being so concerned about 
the seeming imperative to order unwarranted tests and proce-
dures, HCPs can direct greater attention to the adoption of 
measures that really can improve healthcare quality, reduce 
error risk, and lessen the danger of liability: the mistake-
proofing processes examined herein.241 
As noted earlier, adoption of mistake-proofing can have 
implications for the reasonable care standard’s application in 
negligence cases dealing with medical errors. Just as the use of 
mistake-proofing processes can serve as evidence that due care 
was exercised, a defendant’s failure to adopt mistake-proofing 
processes could suggest a failure to use reasonable care—
especially if other HCPs begin adopting such techniques on a 
more widespread basis.242 Would not the latter effect amount to 
a ratcheting-up of the reasonable care standard, and would not 
that be a good reason for HCPs generally to shy away from go-
ing the mistake-proofing route (on the theory that if no one is 
doing it, an individual HCP’s failure to do it might not be seen 
as a failure to use due care)? The first part of this compound 
question merits a “yes” answer; the second part, a “no.” 
One can fairly assume that if mistake-proofing processes 
became widely adopted, such processes would become part of 
what constitutes reasonable care. In that event, an HCP’s fail-
ure to adopt appropriate processes of that sort could suggest a 
failure to exercise reasonable care and could therefore help 
support a negligence claim.243 But that prospect does not fur-
nish a sound reason for HCPs to resist, on an en masse basis, 
adoption of mistake-proofing processes in order to avoid a situ-
ation in which mistake-proofing utilization becomes part of the 
reasonable care norm (to the possible detriment of certain 
HCPs who become defendants). Such a strategy on the part of 
HCPs would miss a far more important point: that adoption of 
mistake-proofing techniques would greatly benefit HCPs in a 
liability avoidance sense. 
If mistake-proofing prevents many medical errors—and 
                                                          
 241. See supra text accompanying notes 122–205. 
 242. Again, a consideration in the reasonable care standard is what other 
HCPs are or are not doing. See supra text accompanying notes 43–52; supra 
note 44. 
 243. Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 165–68. 
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there is reliable evidence that it does244—there will be fewer 
and fewer instances in which error-related bad outcomes for 
patients occur. If there is no error, there can be no liability.245 
The prevention of errors will also go a long way toward reduc-
ing the number of bad outcomes for patients. Of course, it is not 
possible to eliminate all risks of harms. Bad outcomes some-
times result even when all due care was exercised. But any 
HCP, regardless of his, her, or its views concerning the legal 
system and the rules of tort liability, obviously wants to reduce 
the risks of harms to patients to the extent reasonably possible. 
Mistake-proofing holds great promise for doing so.246 
B. ENHANCE HCPS’ UNDERSTANDING OF FRE 407 AND ITS 
STATE COUNTERPARTS 
As an earlier section explained, a lack of understanding on 
the part of HCPs concerning FRE 407 and its state counter-
parts can present an impediment to the adoption of mistake-
proofing processes in the healthcare environment. The concern 
is that HCPs’ implementation of a mistake-proofing measure 
after an incident in which harm came to a patient might be 
used against the HCPs in litigation over that harm, on the the-
ory that pre-harm implementation of the measure could have 
prevented the harm and that the failure to adopt the measure 
earlier was a failure to use reasonable care.247 To the extent 
that this concern is widespread, HCPs could perceive a disin-
centive to adopt mistake-proofing processes and, accordingly, 
could refrain from taking such sensible steps. 
The concern is largely unwarranted, however. The imped-
iment it poses to adoption of mistake-proofing measures can be 
overcome through educating HCPs on the purposes and effects 
of FRE 407 and the similar evidentiary rules existing in many 
states. As previous discussion revealed, these subsequent reme-
dial measures rules provide that evidence of safety enhance-
ment measures taken by a defendant to address the type of risk 
and harm already experienced by a plaintiff cannot generally 
be used against the defendant in the plaintiff’s attempt to es-
                                                          
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 122–205. 
 245. E.g., WING, supra note 32, at 291–92. 
 246. See supra text accompanying notes 133–205. 
 247. GROUT, supra note 17, at 17. See supra text accompanying notes 207, 
216–217. 
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tablish negligence on the defendant’s part. Thus, if the plaintiff 
is to establish negligence, the plaintiff must do so on the basis 
of evidence other than the defendant’s later adoption of the 
safety measure.248 
The subsequent remedial measures rules exist to eliminate 
a disincentive to the adoption of safety enhancement 
measures—the disincentive resulting from defendants’ concern 
that the adoption of the measures could come back to haunt 
them in a negligence case dealing with harm that preceded 
adoption of the measures.249 This is the very concern that can 
operate problematically in the context of medical error-
reduction efforts. Hence, achieving greater awareness among 
HCPs concerning the subsequent remedial measures rules and 
their purpose of eliminating a disincentive to the adoption of 
safety enhancement measures should be a key piece of a strate-
gy to encourage more widespread adoption of mistake-proofing 
processes in healthcare settings. 
C. ENHANCE NATIONAL TRACKING AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF 
PATIENT-SAFETY EFFORTS 
A national move to track and encourage patient-safety ef-
forts on the part of HCPs should help facilitate expanded utili-
zation of mistake-proofing processes. Although the federal gov-
ernment and private organizations have been somewhat active 
in promoting patient safety efforts,250 a more tightly coordinat-
ed national program along those lines is needed. Wider adop-
tion of mistake-proofing processes and more extensive report-
ing by HCPs on those actions (whether to a federal agency or 
an organization operating under a public-private arrangement) 
would make even more meaningful best-practices reports pos-
sible.251 Such reports could encourage HCPs to make greater 
use of mistake-proofing processes by revealing those processes’ 
error-reduction propensities and cost-effective nature. 
The goal of increasing the adoption of mistake-proofing 
measures by HCPs could be furthered, of course, through fed-
                                                          
 248. FED. R. EVID. 407; see also Carver, supra note 209, at 584, 587–89; 
Henderson, supra note 213, at 4–6. 
 249. Guthrie, supra note 213, at 423; Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 
216, at 498. For further discussion of the subsequent remedial measures rules, 
see supra text accompanying notes 208–231. 
 250. For a discussion of the federal government’s patient safety efforts, see 
supra note 115. 
 251. See supra note 115. 
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eral requirements that would mandate such measures as well 
as periodic reports by HCPs on what they have done in that re-
gard. In today’s often gridlocked legislative environment, how-
ever, a proposal to impose such requirements by statute could 
be a non-starter. Imposing such requirements through agency 
regulations (assuming that previous statutes’ delegations of 
power would be broad enough to permit such regulations) could 
not only trigger political objections252 but also involve signifi-
cant practical obstacles. Regulations requiring the adoption of, 
and reporting on, mistake-proofing processes would have to be 
extremely specific and detailed. They would need to address 
such issues as which HCPs are subject to the requirements, 
which particular mistake-proofing techniques are mandated, 
what type and level of implementation by an HCP constitutes 
compliance, what consequences ensue if the HCP does not com-
ply, and various others. The level of detail that would be neces-
sary in such regulations would make their prompt promulga-
tion very unlikely. Even if the regulations ultimately were 
promulgated, the problem of medical errors would continue to 
be insufficiently mitigated during the intervening years. 
A more promising avenue would be to have federal regula-
tions that encourage the use of mistake-proofing through 
providing incentives for doing so. Regulations of the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services already call for financial reim-
bursement to HCPs to be based more on health outcomes than 
had been the case in the past.253 Reimbursement-related incen-
tives for adopting mistake-proofing processes would be a logical 
addition to those regulations. Although the literal application 
of the regulations would be confined to the Medicare and Medi-
caid contexts, HCPs that implement mistake-proofing tech-
niques because of Medicare and Medicaid-related incentives 
would seem likely to employ those techniques more broadly 
(i.e., even outside the Medicare and Medicaid contexts) once 
they see the error-reduction values of the techniques. 
In addition, the federal government has utilized financial 
incentives as a way of encouraging the adoption of electronic 
medical records and electronic systems for prescribing medica-
                                                          
 252. See, e.g., supra note 1. 
 253. See QUALITY MEASURE REPORTING, supra note 119; Kevin Sack, Medi-
care Rules Say ‘Do No Harm’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at A1. 
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tions.254 With error reduction being a primary goal of those in-
centives, a similar approach would make sense in regard to 
mistake-proofing measures. A further possible regulatory ave-
nue could be the addition of incentives for error-reduction 
measures to the rules governing Accountable Care Organiza-
tions, whose creation is encouraged in the 2010 Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act.255 
D. ACCELERATE THE ADOPTION OF ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS FOR 
PRESCRIBING MEDICATIONS 
Earlier discussion in the article noted a number of mis-
take-proofing techniques that can be very helpful in healthcare 
contexts.256 Of course, we advocate adoption of those tech-
niques. We give special emphasis here, however, to the im-
portance of broader utilization of electronic systems for pre-
scribing medications. As noted earlier, the numbers of 
medication errors remain unreasonably high, with the conse-
quences for patients in too many instances being devastat-
ing.257 Electronic systems have been shown to be highly effec-
tive in reducing the numbers of medication errors.258 Prudent 
HCPs clearly should be moving in the direction of using such 
systems. 
Because costs obviously can be an issue, the previously 
noted federal incentives for adopting electronic prescribing sys-
tems should be continued and probably enhanced in order to 
speed the rate at which such adoption takes place. Prudent in-
surance companies should also reward insureds that adopt 
electronic prescribing systems by charging them reduced pre-
miums, given that such systems’ demonstrated usefulness in 
reducing or eliminating errors should lead to less risk of liabil-
                                                          
 254. See 42 C.F.R. § 423.159–160 (2011); Steve Lohr, Big Medical Groups 
Begin Patient Data-Sharing Project, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/big-medical-groups-begin-patient-
data-sharing-project/. 
 255. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 280g-12, 1395jjj (2011); Medicare Shared Savings 
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,973 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 
425). 
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 171–205. 
 257. See supra note 7; supra text accompanying notes 197–202. See also 
Denham et al., supra note 6, at 5, 8 (discussing, among other sorts of medical 
errors, medication errors and the havoc they may wreak); IOM, PREVENTING 
MEDICATION ERRORS, supra note 7, at 113–14 (estimating that at least 1.5 
million preventable medication errors occur each year). 
 258. E.g., Denham et al., supra note 6, at 8. 
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ity for HCPs and their insurers. 
E.  MAKE MEDICAL ERROR-REPORTING A NATIONAL 
REQUIREMENT 
The federal government has taken steps down the medical 
error-reporting path, but the scheme set up so far makes re-
porting optional.259 Although roughly half of the states have 
medical error-reporting laws, with many of them ostensibly 
making reporting mandatory,260 chronic under-reporting ap-
pears to plague the state schemes.261 When the absence of a 
federal requirement is coupled with the incomplete, patchwork-
quilt nature of state reporting requirements and the concerns 
about under-reporting in states that do have reporting laws, 
the resulting picture does not capture the full extent of the 
medical error problem. Only a national reporting requirement 
can provide a true basis for determining whether the problem 
is lessening, increasing, or remaining at the same level over 
time. A national reporting requirement also can lead to a mean-
ingful system of accountability in which HCPs that commit 
large numbers of errors can be identified by consumers making 
healthcare purchasing decisions and by government agency 
personnel determining whether regulatory action may be war-
ranted. 
Although the details of a national regulatory regime re-
quiring error-reporting are largely beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle, three key points are worth noting here. First, a useful 
foundation is already in place in the work of the National Qual-
ity Forum. This private organization has compiled a list of 
twenty-nine “serious reportable events”—a list generally uti-
lized in the present optional reporting systems.262 This list 
would be of obvious value in a regulatory switch to mandatory 
reporting because it would mean that the government would 
not have to start from scratch in determining what should be 
on the list of errors to be reported. Second, in order to safe-
guard the privacy interests of patients, regulations should spec-
ify that the information reported by the HCP not contain pa-
                                                          
 259. See supra note 115. 
 260. See National Survey, supra note 5, at 213–20. 
 261. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 262. See NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, SERIOUS REPORTABLE EVENTS IN 
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tients’ names. Third, in order to encourage compliance with the 
reporting requirement, regulations must provide that in a 
harmed patient’s negligence (or other malpractice) lawsuit con-
cerning an HCP’s supposed error, the fact that the HCP sub-
mitted an error report and the content of the HCP’s report are 
both non-discoverable and not subject to evidentiary use.263 
HCPs thus would not need to be concerned that, by complying 
with the federal reporting requirement, they would be helping 
the plaintiff make out his or her case. 
F.  CONVINCE LIABILITY INSURERS TO EMPLOY EXPERIENCE 
RATING 
In the automobile insurance setting, a driver whose negli-
gence has caused accidents is very likely to be charged higher 
premiums than those charged to an otherwise similarly situat-
ed driver who does not have a history of accident involvement. 
One would expect a similar approach to be employed in the 
realm of medical liability insurance, so that, say, a physician 
against whom multiple malpractice complaints have been made 
would pay more in premiums than would a same-practice-area 
physician against whom no or very few malpractice claims had 
been lodged. But malpractice insurance rating—the process by 
which premiums are set—often does not work that way. In set-
ting premiums for physicians, for instance, insurers frequently 
classify physicians according to specialty and geographic area, 
and then charge the same premiums to all those of a particular 
specialty within a certain geographic area.264 Under this ap-
proach, the history or lack of history of malpractice claims 
against the physician receives little or no consideration when 
the amount of the premium is determined.265 The seemingly er-
ror-prone physician therefore ends up paying premiums of the 
same amount paid by the non-error-prone physician. 
A switch to experience rating—leading to higher premiums 
for those with a history of negligence complaints against them 
and lower premiums for those without such a history—would 
logically furnish an incentive to HCPs to take steps to minimize 
the chances of error. The cause of broadening the utilization of 
mistake-proofing processes could thus be furthered by such a 
                                                          
 263. Such features are present in the current optional reporting system, 
see supra note 115, and should be continued. 
 264. Gunnar, supra note 110, at 471. 
 265. Id.; Hyman & Silver, supra note 110, at 981–82. 
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change in how insurers determine the amounts of premiums. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although harm-causing errors can never be totally elimi-
nated from our healthcare system, the numbers of errors that 
continue to occur remain surprisingly high. Mistake-proofing 
processes afford great promise as error-reduction devices and 
have the further advantage of being cost-effective. Yet obstacles 
seemingly have blocked more widespread utilization of such 
processes. As the article has noted, some of these obstacles 
have stemmed from HCPs’ unclear or flat-out erroneous under-
standing of relevant legal principles dealing with matters of li-
ability and admissible evidence. Overcoming these impedi-
ments in the manner explored in the article and adopting the 
error-reduction recommendations made here would furnish 
benefits all around. Patients would benefit through receiving 
enhanced quality of care and through a reduction in their 
chances of being harmed by medical error. Society and the 
healthcare system as a whole would benefit through cost sav-
ings associated with many fewer instances of error and through 
consumers’ greater confidence in the quality of the care they re-
ceive. HCPs would benefit by having to worry less about liabil-
ity and by thus being freed-up to focus more on what they en-
tered the healthcare field to do: provide high-quality care that 
improves patients’ lives. 
 
